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MULTICULTURALIST LIBERALISM AND HARMS TO WOMEN:   
LOOKING THROUGH THE ISSUE OF “THE VEIL”   
 
Anissa Hélie* and Marie Ashe* 
ABSTRACT 
In response to recent mandates, prohibitions, or “choices” relating to 
veil-wearing by Muslim girls and women, this essay raises and responds to 
the question: “How should civil government treat culture- or religion-based 
claims of rights that clash with the norm of women’s equality?” – that 
question being a broadened reformulation of Susan Okin’s 1999 inquiry, “Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” The essay identifies social and political 
developments, as well as legal and theoretical developments – relating to 
women, religions, and governments – that have occurred in the 21st century 
and that demand that reformulation. Reviewing theories on the veiling 
controversies, and characterizing some as reflecting only partial visions, the 
essay embraces and argues for a re-shaped liberalism that is committedly 
and simultaneously feminist and anti-racist and secular. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 This essay is the first in what will be a three-part set examining the 
interaction of liberal theory and practice with religious and cultural practices 
that challenge or contradict women’s interests in equality. Through a focus 
on recent controversies surrounding veil-wearing by Muslim girls and 
women, we raise and address the question: “How should civil government 
treat culture- or religion-based claims of rights that clash with the norm of 
gender equality?” Our question is a variation – a broadened formulation – of 
the inquiry posed by Susan Moller Okin in her essay of 1999, Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?1 We identify social and political 
developments, as well as legal and theoretical developments, that have 
occurred in the 21st century and that demand reformulation of Okin’s 
inquiry. Thus, we pose and address a question that is both larger and more 
urgent. 
Okin’s “multiculturalism question” focused on how government should 
treat cultural or religious claims raised by minority cultural or religious 
groups.2 Her formulation in 1999 reflected two phenomena that had become 
visible throughout the West during the preceding decade or so. The first of 
these was the ascendance of “multiculturalism” in liberal theory and in 
liberal political practice. Responding in part to their own histories of racism, 
many Western liberal nations adopted policies of multiculturalism intended 
to be more accommodating (i.e. less assimilation-requiring than they had 
been in the past) with regard to both indigenous peoples and recently-arrived 
                                                          
 1  Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM 
BAD FOR WOMEN? (Susan Moller Okin et al. eds., 1999). Okin asked, specifically: “What 
should be done when the claims of minority cultures or religions clash with the norm of gender 
equality that is at least formally endorsed by liberal states (however much they continue to 
violate it in their practices)?” Id. at 9. 
 2  Id. 
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immigrants. This change instantiated – in practice and in theory – a 
“multiculturalist liberalism,” that is, a version of liberalism less critical of 
minority cultures and more ready to regard them as intrinsically valuable. 
The second phenomenon was a global “return” or “revival” of religion, with 
one manifestation of this multi-faceted development being an increased 
public awareness of the religious and cultural practices of newly-visible 
immigrant groups in Europe and in North America. 
Okin explored the interaction of these phenomena. A development that 
particularly engaged her, which she saw as illustrative of both theoretical 
and practical inadequacies of multiculturalist-liberalism, was the 
accommodation of polygamy by the government of France over a period of 
twenty or more years. She documented the expansion of polygamy: “During 
the 1980s, the French government quietly permitted immigrant men to bring 
multiple wives into the country, to the point where an estimated 200,000 
families in Paris are now polygamous . . . . ”3 Okin asserted, confidently and 
unqualifiedly, that the toleration of polygamy harmed the interests of 
Muslim women affected by it: “[O]nce reporters finally got around to 
interviewing the wives, they discovered what the government could have 
learned years earlier: that the women affected by polygamy regarded it as an 
inescapable and barely tolerable institution in their African countries of 
origin, and an unbearable imposition in the French context.”4 And, she cited 
a failure of liberalism in practice: “On this issue, no politically effective 
opposition galvanized.”5 
Okin’s claim was that the failure in practice had been fed by a failure in 
theory, by a weakening of liberalism’s formal commitment to gender 
equality attributable to its dalliance with multiculturalism. A misguided 
toleration supported by multiculturalist values, she perceived, had led 
liberalism to privileging the interests of minority religious and cultural 
groups over the equality of women. Okin therefore urged – against an 
uncritically multiculturalist turn – liberalism’s prioritizing of women’s 
equality, and its recommitment to the norm of gender equality.6 
Writing in 2012, we find it necessary to broaden Okin’s question – and 
her critique of liberalism in practice and in theory – because of 
developments that have occurred in the years since her essay. The first of 
these has been the heightened focus on populations of Muslim heritage as 
problematic in both Europe and North America. The second has been the 
great expansion of the power of religious institutions inimical to women’s 
equality. These developments, together, have deepened the challenge to 
                                                          
 3  Id. at 9. 
 4  Id. at 10.  
 5  Id. 
 6  See id. at 23-24. 
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liberal theory’s critical capacities and moral/political commitments. Because 
of these trends, our focus will be broader than Okin’s: our interest is not only 
in patriarchal minority religions but in all patriarchal religions whose 
practices conflict with women’s equality. However, like her, we will begin 
our inquiry by examining a particular group; we focus specifically on 
developments in Muslim communities because these have particularly 
affected public debates and legal decisions in Western contexts. 
The numerous and relevant changes affecting debates and law, that 
have occurred since 1999, have included attacks by radical Islamists on 
western targets:7 on New York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 
2001; on subways in Madrid in March, 2004; and on London subways in 
July 2005. They have also included intensive reactions framed as retaliations 
to the 9/11 attacks, with wars prosecuted by the United States and its 
Western allies against Iraq and in Afghanistan. They have included 
incarceration – effectively without possibility of judicial review of Muslims 
characterized as “enemy combatants” (in Guantanamo, in prisons in the 
United States, and elsewhere), as well as massive and indiscriminate 
surveillance broadly targeting Muslims. They have included manifestations 
of racism against Muslims (“Islamophobia”8), evident in random attacks on 
Muslims or people perceived as Muslims; in discrimination against Muslims 
seeking to construct mosques in many areas; and in fears about “Sharia law” 
in areas where that law does not at all exist. They have included multiple 
prosecutions (often unsuccessful in the United States) of Muslim men 
alleged to be terrorists, and well-founded perceptions – and reactions to 
those perceptions – by Muslims who believe that they are experiencing 
systematic and discriminatory governmental harassment. They have 
included a globally-worsening economic reality in which employment 
                                                          
 7  It should be noted that most of the people killed by Muslim extremists are other 
Muslims, or local people of various religions. A 2009 study of Arabic media sources by the 
Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point found that only 15% of all of the casualties of al-
Qaeda between 2004 and 2008 were Westerners. Between 2006-2008, the most recent period 
the study examined, 98% of al-Qaeda's victims were inhabitants of Muslim majority countries. 
SCOTT HELFSTEIN ET AL., DEADLY VANGUARDS: A STUDY OF AL-QA’IDA’S VIOLENCE 
AGAINST MUSLIMS 2 (Dec. 2009), available at 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_DeadlyVanguards_StudyOfAlQaida
sViolenceAgainstMuslims.pdf. 
 8  As noted by Meredith Tax: “We must unpack the concept of ‘Islamophobia,’ which 
includes two main and very different meanings. In popular speech and the media, the term is 
used to mean discrimination, prejudice, hatred of, and violent attacks upon Muslims in the 
West; blanket police surveillance is often included in this usage. When used by Islamists, the 
term includes any criticism of their ideas or of Muslim texts, as well as invasions of ‘Muslim 
lands,’ which are attributed to a hatred of Islam rather than to geopolitical reasons like the 
desire to control territory, trade, or oil.” See MEREDITH TAX, DOUBLE BIND: THE MUSLIM 
RIGHT, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEFT, AND UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2012).  
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possibilities – even for the well-educated – have dramatically declined. All 
these developments have contributed to the heightening of racist and anti-
immigration sentiments in Western contexts, and to the continuing failures 
of many Western nations to provide the meaningful social services that 
would elevate the position of migrants and citizens of Muslim heritage 
above their current second- or third-class status. Thus, the situation in which 
we now write is one that has worsened drastically since 1999. 
Another change that has occurred is the increased visibility in Western 
areas of women wearing hijabs (often referenced as “headscarves”9) or other 
forms of veils that are understood to identify them as Muslims. Both 
Western and non-Western nations have introduced or intensified regulations 
of veil-wearing – often by laws mandating or prohibiting veil-wearing in 
particular public spaces. Media accounts of harm to women, occasioned by 
the wearing or not wearing of such garb, have proliferated in response to 
regulatory initiatives or changes. When Okin wrote in 1999, she saw French 
schoolgirls’ wearing of “headscarves” as a minor issue. No one today can 
possibly share that perception. As we will discuss, the Muslim veil – in its 
manifold variations – appears at the current time an always-already 
politically-charged symbol, one that (like the cross, the crucifix, the Star of 
David, or perhaps the swastika) cannot presently be neutral, regardless of the 
motive or intention of the individual wearer. This changed reality accounts 
for the structure of our inquiry here. We address the maximally-broad 
question about the degree to which legal-liberalism should tolerate or 
accommodate any religion-based practices that are hostile to women’s 
equality. And we approach that broad question through a lens focused 
particularly and specifically on the issues of whether (and where, and when) 
veil-wearing should be tolerated or accommodated. 
Utilizing a compressed timeline, Section I presents some key events 
relating to Muslim veil-wearing that have occurred in recent years. It 
documents a 21st century global history of religio-political practices 
injurious to women and highly contradictory of women’s equality. 
In Section II, we discuss theoretical contributions that are relevant to the 
general question of whether multiculturalist-liberalism is bad for women and 
that have focused particularly on the question of the Muslim veil. We 
consider, first, the contributions of writers (Joan Wallach Scott and Martha 
Nussbaum) who, while they identify as feminist, are more sympathetic to 
multiculturalism and to religious-group liberty than to women’s equality. 
We characterize their work as vision-impaired liberalism – because it is 
blind to the realities of increasing harms to women produced by the 
preferencing of religions – and we identify features of their work that render 
it so blind. We consider, secondly, writers (Leila Ahmed and Marnia 
                                                          
 9  For discussion of terminology related to veiling, see infra Section I. 
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Lazreg) whose work we assess as partial and “monocular” in its relationship 
to multiculturalist-liberalism. We believe that they accurately discern and 
report on the real injuries that women suffer as a consequence of religiously 
imposed constraints on their liberty and equality. But we think that 
unfounded optimism – perhaps provoked in part by liberalism’s deep 
aversion to “intolerant” policies – leads each of them to close one eye and to 
fail to recognize that sometimes governmental action of a prohibitive kind 
may be needed to undo or to protect against harm to women. Finally, we 
also introduce in Section II, in translation from its French text, the very 
recent writing of Nadia Geerts. We characterize this writing as “binocular” 
in its critical perspectives – capable of extraordinarily broad as well as 
highly specific focus. We document Geerts’ insistent advocacy of 
liberalism’s re-commitment to protection of secular values, and its re-
prioritizing of commitment to women’s equality in the face of any 
contending religion-based claim. 
In Section III, we evaluate these theoretical contributions, finding 
particular strength in their historicizing and contextualizing moves. Building 
upon those perspectives, we urge a new direction in liberal theory, corrective 
of the turn taken in the last decades and available for reform of liberal-
democratic shaping of the law. The liberalism we advocate is one that – 
released from the effect of cultural relativism and its indiscriminate 
endorsement of groups’ interests – will unequivocally support individual 
women’s equality and liberty. We propose that the necessary correction-of-
course will require liberalism’s acknowledgment of its past and ongoing 
collusion with religious interests deeply inimical to women. The liberalism 
we advocate will respond to both the narrow and the broad questions we’ve 
explored. It will offer guidance for answering the specific question of the 
regulation of the veil, insisting that in the hierarchy of rights, women’s 
equality must always be preferred, relative to the conflicting rights-claims of 
any religious or cultural group. And it will urge that liberalism must re-
commit to secularism as a condition of its effective advancement of 
feminism and of anti-racism. 
 I. FACTS AND LAW ABOUT “THE VEIL” 
“The veil” has been examined from multiple perspectives (historical, 
anthropological, legal, etc.). Indeed it appears to have triggered as much 
obsession as “the harem”10 did in colonial times. Much recent academic 
                                                          
 10  Western colonial writings, in both the English and French traditions, overwhelmingly 
depicted “the harem” as emblematic of the alleged inferior status of “Eastern women.” 
Throughout the eighteenth-, -nineteenth-, and early-twentieth centuries, colonial imagery 
carefully staged visuals emphasizing women’s seclusion or idleness, while Western scholars 
and travelers’ vivid depictions of the subjugation of ‘Oriental’ women long provided a core 
HELIE AND ASHE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2013 3:41 PM 
2012] Multiculturalist Liberalism and Harms to Women 7 
work has focused on case studies linked to specific cultural or national 
settings.11 We intend, however – in examining the broad question we 
identified in our Introduction – to reflect on a broader variety of socio-
political contexts, and to consider how liberalism ought to respond to that 
worldwide phenomenon. 
To provide a basis for examining the question of “the veil” from a more 
global perspective, a timeline of recent factual and legal developments is 
provided in this section. The timeline records facts reported in the media 
about veil-related events that occurred, across the globe, during the years 
2004-2012. It highlights: mandates that women (and/or young girls) veil; 
demands asserting a “right to veil;” and, some policies and judicial 
responses elaborated in response to those mandates or demands. 
 The information gathered here illuminates the reality that trends toward 
increased veiling are affecting all regions of the world. The timeline shows 
the inadequacy of interpreting any veil-related story in isolation. Looking at 
them together discloses their linkages to one another, to a political and 
militant Islamism, and to the global revival of religious fundamentalisms in 
general. 
Some preliminary comments: 
First, we have included here information that concerns both women and 
girls, even though we are keenly aware that these two categories deserve to 
be examined separately. (Our reasons for doing so are more fully explained 
in Section III.) 
Secondly, a note related to terminology: The media and most 
commentators typically refer to “the veil” without clarifying that the term 
refers to a wide range of dress codes, ranging from the hijab to the burqa to 
the sitar, etc. We recognize that these garments impact women in different 
ways and require different responses – yet we also squarely place the 
“headscarf” or the “scarf” in the category of “the veil” (unlike J. W. Scott 
who argues that the “headscarf” and the veil are not to be confused12). To 
some degree, our decision about terminological usage is affected by 
etymology: as the Chief Justice of Baluchistan High Court, Qazi Faez Isa, 
has explained in recent commentary: “Hijab is the Arabic word for ‘veil’ and 
may also be used to describe a screen, cover(ing), partition, division, mantle, 
                                                          
argument in favor of the West’s “civilizing mission”. MALEK ALLOULA, THE COLONIAL 
HAREM (Myrna Godzich & Wlad Godzich trans., 1986); DALE F. EICKELMAN & JON W. 
ANDERSON, NEW MEDIA IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: EMERGING PUBLIC SPHERE 103 (2d ed. 
2003); SARAH GRAHAM-BROWN, IMAGES OF WOMEN: THE PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN 
PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 1860-1950 (1988). 
 11  For a discussion of veiling in specific contexts, see infra Section II.  
 12  See Joan W. Scott, Symptomatic Politics: The Banning of Islamic Headscarves in 
French Public Schools, 23 FRENCH POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 106, 118 (2005). 
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curtain, drape or divider.”13 We therefore distance ourselves from the usage 
of highly innocuous terms such as headscarf, scarf, or “head coverings” 
primarily because we believe that those terms distract from or obscure the 
reality that the veil is intended to deliver non-innocuous messages: a visual 
distinction between males and females; a marking of the female body in 
public space; a sign of “modesty” (i.e. sexual unavailability); etc. While we 
distinguish wherever possible between hijab and more drastic forms of 
veiling, we do consider that all veils – whether they are used as screens, 
coverings, partitions, curtains, or clothing etc. – are intended and employed 
as physical demarcations of gender boundaries, in ways that accentuate 
gender differences and that are detrimental to women’s equality. 
 
TIMELINE 
 
2003/ SYRIA, EGYPT, JORDAN, QATAR 
The doll “Fulla” quickly becomes the most popular among dolls 
designed to express “Muslim values.” Depending on the country, Fulla 
wears a full veil or a lighter hijab. A 2005 TV commercial introducing a new 
line of doll clothes reminds: “When you take Fulla out of the house, don’t 
forget her new spring abaya!”14 In 2010, a Fulla doll is “clad in a headscarf 
and a full length abaya, with the box proudly proclaiming “Fulla in her 
outdoor clothes.”15 
 
2004/ MALAYSIA 
The north-eastern state of Terrenganu promulgates that “Muslim 
women will have to wear a headscarf drawn tightly about the face.” (No 
indication is given at this time that the “traditional loosely draped Malay 
headscarf will be banned.”)16 
 
2004/ MALAYSIA 
In the state of Terengganu, the main city of Kuala Terrengganu – while 
                                                          
 13  Justice Qazi Faez Isa notes that “[t]he word hijab appears seven times in the Quran” 
and that “[i]n none of the aforesaid seven verses the word hijab is used to indicate a dress code 
for a Muslim lady.” Qazi Faez Isa, The Veil & Islam, PAK. CHRISTIAN POST, 
http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/viewarticles.php?editorialid=1434 (last visited Nov. 25, 
2012). 
 14  Katherine Zoepf, Barbie Pushed Aside in Mideast Cultural Shift, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/21/world/africa/21iht-journal.html?_r=4. 
 15  Baher Ibrahim, This Trend of Young Muslim Girls Wearing the Hijab Is Disturbing, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/nov/23/muslim-girls-wearing-hijab.  
 16  Jonathan Kent, Malaysian City Rules on Women, BBC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3368115.stm. 
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the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) was in power - “imposed its own dress 
code for non-Muslim women working in the private sector.”17 
 
2004/ FRANCE 
A new law banning the display of “all ostentatious religious symbols” 
in public schools becomes effective.18 
 
2004/ AUSTRALIA 
The hijab is incorporated into the uniform of Victoria state police.19 
 
March 2005/ ALGERIA 
A Saudi pamphlet, initiated by the “Service of the donors of books” 
with headquarters in Ryad, is circulated in Algiers. Entitled “To the woman 
who has fallen into the spider’s web,” it attacks, among other targets, women 
who do not wear the hijab.20 
 
September 2005/ UK 
The retailer IKEA agrees to offer to female Muslim staff in some of its 
stores a branded hijab.21 
 
November 2005/ FRANCE (STRASBOURG) 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decides 
Sahin v. Turkey, upholding the Turkish governmental ban on the wearing of 
hijab by university students and faculty. The Court notes that the hijab 
                                                          
 17  This measure also “bans anything that is considered moderately revealing clothing to 
sexy attires in public and private departments[.]” Note that the Salahuddin, a spokesman for 
PAS’ Youth section, clarified in a press statement the party’s take on individuals’ rights and 
duties: “The question of violating basic human rights does not arise when enforcing the 
compulsory rule of covering the aurat (parts of the body that should not be exposed according 
to Islamic belief)[.]” Salahuddin added that it was “not a matter of rights but of responsibility 
to adhere to rules set by Allah.” Kazi Mahmood, Malaysian City Imposes Islamic Dress Code 
on Women, ISLAM ONLINE (Jan. 10, 2004), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/1055499/posts.  
 18  See France’s Hijab Ban, CBC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2004), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/islam/hijab.html. 
 19  Lorna Edwards, Making Hijab Part of Victoria Police Uniform, THE AGE (Nov. 27, 
2004), http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Making-hijab-part-of-Victoria-Police-
uniform/2004/11/26/1101219743263.html?from=moreStories&oneclick=true. 
 20  The editorial of the Algerian daily El Watan states, “At the time our country is engaged 
in the debate about the Family Code, Saudis circulated a pamphlet . . . through [which they] 
continue to propagate obscurantism and archaism, doing so under the cover of religion.” 
Tayeb, Que veulent les Saoudiens?, EL WATAN (Mar. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.djazairess.com/fr/elwatan/15256. 
 21  Muslim Staff Given Branded Hijab, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/4179930.stm.  
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carries political significance in Turkey and may require limitations to protect 
“rights and freedoms of others” and “maintenance of public order.” The 
Court relies particularly strongly on Turkish understandings of the 
importance of secularism and of gender equality.22 
 
June 2006/ UK 
A medical student calls for the British Medical Association’s 
conference to allow Muslim women to wear a ‘theatre hijab’ in operation 
theatres. She also suggests “putting up screens to shield Muslim women 
from male colleagues when washing/cleansing before an operation.”23 
 
2006/ CHECHNYA 
The Chechen government starts “demanding that female state workers 
wear headscarves.” A civil servant states: “I received a verbal warning that if 
I did not wear a headscarf, I would lose my job. I had to wear it the next day 
so as not to bring trouble on my head.”24 
 
2006/ UK 
In Begum v. Headteacher & Governors of Denbigh High School, the 
House of Lords relies on European Court of Human Rights decision of Sahin 
v. Turkey (2005), and upholds the decision of school authorities not to admit 
a schoolgirl who sought to wear a jilbab (long black coat) to her high school 
(which already permitted hijab-wearing).25 
 
February 2008/ TURKEY 
Turkey is “at odds over headscarf ban” and “Turkey’s ruling party, 
AKP, agreed with the MHP party to lift a decades-old ban on Islamic 
headscarves in universities.”26On February 7, 1998, the Turkish Parliament 
passed an amendment to Turkey’s Constitution allowing women to wear 
                                                          
 22  See generally Sahin v.Turk., App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956.  
 23  AYESHA SALMA KARIAPPER, WALKING A TIGHTROPE: WOMEN AND VEILING IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 73 (2009), available at 
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/Walking%20a%20Tightrope-v2i-Final-
Web%20version.pdf. 
 24 Chechnya, WOMEN’S UN REPORT NETWORK, 
http://www.wunrn.com/news/2006/03_19_06/032006_chechnya_women.htm (last visited Jan. 
31, 2013).  
 25  See generally R v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 
15 (appeal taken Eng.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060322/begum-1.htm. 
 26  Pelin Turgut, Turkey at Odds over Headscarf Ban, TIME (Feb. 8, 2008), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1711292,00.html. 
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hijab in universities.27 
 
June 2008/ TURKEY 
The Constitutional Court of Turkey annuls the amendment intended by 
Parliament to end the headscarf ban, on grounds that removing the ban 
contradicted founding principles of secularism expressed in the Turkish 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court’s decision is not appealable.28 
 
2009/ UK 
The Metropolitan Police in London agrees to offer the hijab as an 
option for “Muslim women serving in the force.”29 
 
2009/ SUDAN 
Lubna Ahmed Al Hussein, a Sudanese citizen, is prosecuted for 
wearing trousers and sentenced to 40 lashes in July 2009 (Article 152 of 
Sudanese criminal code prohibits “dressing indecently”). According to the 
director of police, in 2008 in Khartoum State alone, 43,000 women were 
arrested for clothing offences.30 
 
2009/ FRANCE (STRASBOURG) 
The European Court of Human Rights, Fifth Section, decides Dogru v. 
France, upholding policy adopted in French lycee that had prohibited hijab-
wearing in gym class.31 
 
2009/ KYRGYZSTAN 
Women journalists are no longer allowed to enter the press club without 
headscarves. Also, the president issues paintball guns to gangs of young 
men, to shoot at women who are not covered in the streets.32 
 
                                                          
 27  See Mehran Derakhshandeh, Just a Headscarf?, TEHRAN TIMES (Feb. 17, 2008), 
http://www.mehrnews.ir/en/NewsDetail.aspx?newsID=639942.  
 28  See Court Annuls Turkish Scarf Reform, BBC NEWS (June 5, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7438348.stm.  
 29  See Police Adopt Uniform Hijab, THIS IS LEICESTERSHIRE (Jan. 31, 2009), 
http://www.thisisleicestershire.co.uk/Police-adopt-uniform-hijab/story-12058583-
detail/story.html. 
 30  Lubna Hussein, When I Think of My Trial, I Pray My Fight Won't Be in Vain, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/04/sudan-
woman-trousers-trial. 
 31  See generally Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2008), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90039. 
 32  According to Nadia Azgikhina, Secretary of the Russia Union of Journalists in 
Moscow. Interview with Meredith Tax, in N.Y. (Sept. 17, 2010). 
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October 2009/ EGYPT 
The leader of Al-Azhar University (the foremost Sunni authority) 
decides to “ban the niqab at the Islamic Institute’s schools and institutes.” 
The Minister of Higher Education follows suit, banning “students who wear 
the niqab from living in the university dorms.”33 
 
2010/ CHECHNYA 
The Chechen government expands its “virtue campaign”: “Men in 
security-force vehicles assault women who are not ‘covered enough’ – i.e. 
who didn’t wear headscarves, long dresses, long sleeves – with paintball 
guns.”34 While men violently enforce the compulsory dress code, 
propaganda ensures that women get the message: 
Dear Sisters! We want to remind you that, in accordance with 
the rules and customs of Islam, every Chechen woman 
is OBLIGED TO WEAR A HEADSCARF. Are you not disgusted 
when you hear the indecent ‘compliments’ and proposals that 
are addressed to you because you have dressed so provocatively 
and have not covered your head? THINK ABOUT IT!!! Today we 
have sprayed you with paint, but this is only a WARNING!!! 
DON’T COMPEL US TO HAVE RECOURSE TO MORE PERSUASIVE 
MEASURES!!!’”35 
March 2010/ CANADA (QUEBEC) 
Quebec National Assembly considers enactment of “niqab ban” 
specifying that persons seeking governmental services must show their faces 
during the delivery of services.36 
 
April 2010/ KYRGYZSTAN 
Makhmud Aripov, imam of the Nabijon Haji Mosque in Osh, states: 
“Wearing a hijab secures a woman’s chastity, and a lack of hijabs results in 
divorces. A mother wearing a hijab serves an example for her daughter, 
                                                          
 33  See Al Azhar Bans the Niquab, GULF BLOG (Oct. 10, 2009), 
http://thegulfblog.com/tag/al-azhar/. 
 34  Urgent Action Fund, Annual Report 2010, URGENT ACTION FUND FOR WOMEN’S 
HUM. RTS. 6 (2010), available at http://urgentactionfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/UAF_Annual_Report_Web_2010.pdf. See generally You 
Dress According to Their Rules: Enforcement of an Islamic Dress Code for Women in 
Chechnya, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/chechnya0311webwcover.pdf.  
 35  Tanya Lokshina, Chechnya: Choked by Headscarves, OPENDEMOCRACY (Sept. 27, 
2010), http://www.opendemocracy.net/tanya-lokshina/chechnya-choked-by-headscarves. 
 36  See Quebec Bans Niqab from Government Services, CANADIAN PRESS (Mar. 24, 
2009), http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/784657--quebec-ans-niq. 
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which will help secure her honour.”37 
 
October 2010/ UK 
Three private schools for girls aged 11-18 (in Lancaster, Leicester and 
London) “introduced a compulsory veil policy” to be worn by students on 
their way to and from school. Pupils are required to wear a uniform 
comprised of “the black Burka and Niqab” (Madani website) or the “Black 
Jubbah [smock-like outer garment] and dopatta [shawl], as well as purdah 
[veil]. Scarves are strictly not permitted” (Jamea Al Kauthar website), or 
“the headscarf and habaya for all pupils, and niqab for girls attending the 
secondary years” (Jameah Girls Academy website).38 
 
2010/ INDONESIA (ACEH) 
Two local “Sharia-inspired laws” regulate female dress code and 
“association between members of the opposite sex” in Aceh province. 
“While the law requires men to cover their body between the knee and the 
navel, Muslim women must cover the entire body, except for hands, feet, 
and face . . . Further, women constitute the overwhelming majority of those 
reprimanded by the Sharia police.”39 
 
2010/ INDIA (KOLKATA) 
The Deoband seminary, “the most powerful Islamic seminary in South 
Asia,” issues a fatwa ruling that “it is unlawful for women to work or 
interact with men if they do not wear veils.” Muslim community leaders and 
women’s groups protest the edict.40 
 
2010/ SRI LANKA (EASTERN REGION) 
The rising influence of Wahhabism (often imported by overseas 
workers back from Saudi Arabia) leads to increasing veiling practices in the 
                                                          
 37  Islamic Veil and Fundamentalism Are Back in Bishkek, ASIANEWS (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Islamic-veil-and-fundamentalism-are-back-in-Bishkek-
18289.html. 
 38  David Barrett, British Schools Where Girls Must Wear the Islamic Veil, TELEGRAPH 
(Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/8038820/British-schools-
where-girls-must-wear-the-Islamic-veil.html. 
 39  Indonesia: Local Sharia Laws Violate Rights in Aceh, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 1, 
2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/29/indonesia-local-sharia-laws-violate-rights-aceh; 
see also HUM. RTS. WATCH,  POLICING MORALITY: ABUSES IN THE APPLICATION OF SHARIA 
IN ACEH, INDONESIA 5 (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/indonesia1210WebVersionToPost.pdf. 
 40  Established in 1867, the Darul Uloom Deoband seminary follows the conservative 
Hanafi school of thought. Shaikh Azizur Rahman, Indian Protest at Muftis’ Ban on Women at 
Work, THE NAT’L (May 21, 2010), http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-
asia/indian-protest-at-muftis-ban-on-women-at-work?pageCount=0.  
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east of the country: “In recent years local women have come under growing 
pressure from conservatives. They are now urged to cover their faces in 
public, something that had not previously been the cultural practice there.”41 
 
2010/ SRI LANKA (COLOMBO) 
Female students report being pressured to veil on Colombo University’s 
compounds: male peers want them to conform to the ideal of a “good 
Muslim woman” arguing that they must “represent the community.”42 
 
April 2010/ BELGIUM 
By unanimous vote in Belgium’s lower house of Parliament, the 
Belgian Chamber of Representatives “passed a nationwide ban prohibiting 
women from wearing full-face Islamic veils in public places, the first move 
of its kind in Western Europe.” The measure remains to be voted on by the 
Senate.43 
 
October 2010/ FRANCE 
France’s statute banning public wearing of “clothing designed to 
conceal the face” is approved by French Constitutional Council.44 
 
October 2010/ BIN LADEN 
Bin Laden threatens France, which plans to ban full face veils in public 
spaces, stating: “If you unjustly thought that it is in your right to prevent free 
Muslim women from wearing the face veil, is it not our right to expel your 
invading men and cut necks?”45 
 
December 2010/ TURKEY 
Despite the Constitutional Court ruling of 2008, most Turkish 
universities now permit students to wear hijab. 46 
 
                                                          
 41 Swaminathan Natarajan, Sri Lanka Police Investigate Attack on Teenage Girls, BBC 
NEWS (Jun. 28, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13948979.  
 42  Interview with Neloufer De Mel, Professor, University of Colombo, in N.Y. (Oct. 20, 
2010). 
 43  Edward Cody, Belgian Lawmakers Vote to Ban Full-face Veils in Public, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/29/AR2010042904504.html. 
 44  See French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, CNN (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/07/france.burqa.ban/index.html.  
 45  Bin Laden in Warning to France, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2010/10/2010102710253569309.html. 
 46  See Jonathan Head, Quiet End to Turkey’s Headscarf Ban, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11880622. 
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December 11, 2010/ AZERBAIJAN 
Azerbaijan’s Education Minister issues a reminder that “girls should 
comply with official rules on school uniforms, which forbid the wearing of 
the hijab . . . Hundreds of people” protest in response.47 
 
March 10, 2011/ CHECHNYA 
“Men believed to be law enforcement officials” impose dress codes 
through “acts of violence, harassment, and threats to intimidate [women] 
into wearing a headscarf or dressing more ‘modestly,’ in long skirts and 
sleeves to cover their limbs.”48 
 
March 2011/ TUNISIA 
The “Defense Committee of Veiled Women in Tunisia” demands that 
the Minister of Interior overturn a 1993 decree stipulating that women 
seeking identification papers need to provide pictures showing their eyes and 
hair: “We will follow this issue closely and ensure that all parties 
responsible for such reprehensible actions face consequences.”49 
 
April 2011/ EGYPT 
The Supreme Administrative Court in Cairo “upheld a decision to ban 
the wearing of the niqab – the full covering except eyes – in examinations at 
universities.”50 
 
July 2011/ BELGIUM 
“A law has come into force in Belgium banning women from wearing 
the full Islamic veil in public.”51 
 
                                                          
 47  Azerbaijan Police Break Up Pro-hijab Rally, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Dec. 
11,  2010), http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan_police_break_up_hijab_rally/ 
2245260.html. 
 48  Russia: Chechnya Enforcing Islamic Dress Code, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/10/russia-chechnya-enforcing-islamic-dress-code; see 
Lejla Medanhodzic & Masum Momaya, Paintball Guns and “Islamic” Decrees Police 
Chechnya’s Women, AWID (Jan. 21, 2011), http://secure1.awid.org/eng/Issues-and-
Analysis/Library/Paintball-Guns-and-Islamic-Decrees-Police-Chechnya-s-Women.  
 49  The Defense Committee of Veiled Women in Tunisia, Tunisian Ministry of the Interior 
Affairs Refuses Photos with the Veil in ID Cards, ASSABILONLINE (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.assabilonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10404&Itemid=
55. 
 50  Mohamed Abdel Salam, Egypt Court Upholds Niqab Ban, BIKYA MASR (Apr. 24, 
2011), http://www.bikyamasr.com/33023/egypt-court-upholds-niqab-ban/. 
 51  Belgian Ban on Full Veils Comes Into Force, BBC NEWS (July 23, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14261921. 
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July 2011/ ALGERIA 
New modalities regarding identification documents are introduced, 
stipulating that “the woman is not asked to remove her scarf while her 
picture is being taken for her ID card or passport.” A woman “is not required 
to show her ears or hair” but must leave “the face appear in its entirety, 
including eyes and mouth.”52 
 
December 2011/ CANADA 
Supreme Court of Canada hears arguments about whether woman may 
testify against defendant in a criminal prosecution while wearing niqab.53 
 
March 2012/ AUSTRALIA / NEW SOUTH WALES 
In the State of New South Wales, new rules establish that Muslim 
women “will be required to show their faces when they have documents 
witnessed under new identity check laws.” The rules were drawn up after the 
successful appeal by a veiled Muslim woman of her criminal conviction. She 
had been convicted on a charge of falsely accusing a police officer of trying 
to remove her burqa during a random breath test). The conviction was 
overturned when the she claimed that because the woman who had made the 
accusation had been wearing a burqa, the prosecution could not possibly 
have proven her identity.54 
 
April 2012/ TURKEY 
Nicolas Bratza, the President of the European Court of Human Rights, 
visiting Turkey “for ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the 
establishment of the [Turkish] Constitutional Court,” is reported to have said 
that the Court may “revise” its ruling in Sahin v. Turkey.55 
 
 
                                                          
 52  Note that the Algerian daily Le Matin, Algiers, qualifies these new modalities as 
“government’s step back”, given that previously, Algerian women could not wear a scarf in 
photos taken for the purpose of national ID card or passport. Photo de femme voilée sur le 
passeport: le gouvernement recule, LE MATIN DZ (July 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.lematindz.net/news/4772-photo-de-femme-voilee-sur-le-passeport-le-
gouvernement-recule.html. 
 53  Niqab Case Goes to Canada’s Top Court, CBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/12/08/niqab-supreme-court.html.  
 54  Alison Rourke, Australian Muslim Women Must Show Faces for Identity Checks 
Under New Law, GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/05/australian-muslim-women-identity-checks. 
 55  See Student Becomes First Veiled Woman to Take Oath in Parliament, TODAY’S 
ZAMAN (Apr. 27, 2012), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=278822.  
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May 2012/ EGYPT 
In areas of Greater Cairo, Muslim and Christian women who “do not 
cover their hair or who wear mid-sleeved clothing are met with insults, 
spitting and in some cases physical abuse (. . .) Prominent Bishop Bishoy 
recently declared that Christian women ‘should follow the example of their 
Muslim sisters and dress more modestly’. Throughout Egypt, “many Coptic 
women have been told ‘Our Lady Mariam [St Mary] used to wear a tarha, 
why can’t you follow her example and cover up?’”56 
 
July 1, 2012/ MOROCCO 
The Center for Woman’s Equality launches a campaign against the 
veiling of young girls aged 3-10 year-old, describing it as a major form of 
child abuse: “Young girls are forced into wearing a headscarf by parents 
who tell them it will protect them from harassment or ensure they don’t go 
to hell.”57 
 
July 2012/ EGYPT 
The first TV channel “completely operated by women wearing the full 
face veil (niqab),” Mariya, is launched, airing for six hours daily. If the 
channel cannot find a niqabi expert on a given issue, Mariya will give their 
guests two options: “either to wear the niqab temporarily during the 
programme, or have their faces blurred out while the programme is being 
broadcast.”58 
 
May 2012/ PAKISTAN (NWFP) 
A member of the provincial assembly of the NWFP has introduced a 
resolution requiring that wearing a veil should be made compulsory for 
every girl above 12 years of age.59 
 
 
                                                          
 56  Note that Coptic Christians in Egypt account for roughly 12% of the population, and 
that Bishoy is “one of the nominees for the papal seat of the Coptic Orthodox Church.” Mariz 
Tadros, Egypt's Women Have Had Enough of Being Told to Cover Up, GUARDIAN (May 29, 
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/29/egypt-women-cover-up-
coptic?INTCMP=SRCH. 
 57  The campaign’s slogan is “So that girls won’t live in eternal darkness.” Manal Wahbi, 
Campaign Against Veiling Young Girls Launched in Morocco, AL ARABIYA (July 1, 2012), 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/01/223803.html. 
 58  New Egyptian TV Channel to Only Feature Fully Face-veiled Women, MUSLIM 
WOMEN NEWS, http://www.muslimwomennews.com/n.php?nid=6918 (last visited Nov. 25, 
2012). 
 59  Isa, supra note 13. 
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August 2012/ TUNISIA 
Two athletes, medalists at the 2012 London Olympics, are the target of 
a violent campaign on social networks affiliated with Islamist circles. 
Female runner Habiba Ghribi’s60 sport gear is denounced as “indecent” and 
“too revealing.” She is accused of having “shamed Tunisian women” and 
there are calls to strip her of her Tunisian citizenship.61 
II. THEORISTS OF VEILING 
The facts and law outlined above identify a background against which 
we will consider the contributions of several theorists who have turned their 
attention to intersections between religion, women, and law, specifically as 
those have recently become visible in connection with Muslim women’s 
veiling practices. We provide overviews of the contributions recently offered 
by these authors, preliminary to considering the value of their work for the 
project of a political liberalism capable of addressing 21st century realities. 
A. Blind Multiculturalism: Martha Nussbaum and Joan Wallach Scott 
Okin addressed only summarily what she called the “headscarf 
controversy” that had been prominently alive in France for more than a 
decade prior to her writing, because she saw it as minor in comparison to the 
polygamy problem. Further, she was not particularly concerned with the 
“official concern over head scarves.” She summarized: 
In the late 1980s. . .a sharp public controversy erupted in France 
about whether Maghrebin girls could attend school wearing the 
traditional Muslim head scarves regarded as proper attire for 
post-pubescent young women. Staunch defenders of secular 
education lined up with some feminists and far-right nationalists 
against the practice; much of the Old Left supported the 
multiculturalist demands for flexibility and respect for diversity, 
accusing opponents of racism or cultural imperialism. At the 
very same time, however, the public was virtually silent about a 
problem of vastly greater importance to many French Arab and 
African immigrant women: polygamy. 
Any suspicion that official concern about head scarves was 
                                                          
 60  A photograph of victorious Olympic runner Ghribi is accessible at Des islamistes 
menacent des athlètes des JO, 20 MINUTES (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.20min.ch/ro/news/monde/story/Des-islamistes-menacent-des-athletes-des-JO-
28414758. 
 61  See Eyes on Tunisia, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/eyes-tunisia-0022316. 
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motivated by an impulse toward gender equality is belied by the 
easy adoption of a permissive policy on polygamy, despite the 
burdens this practice imposes on women and the warnings 
disseminated by women from the relevant cultures.62 
Among the respondents to Okin’s essay was American philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum. In her essay, A Plea for Difficulty, Nussbaum 
characterized Okin’s approach as too “easy,” criticizing what she saw as 
Okin’s inadequate appreciation of the positive value of religion and her 
overestimation of the value of “human autonomy.”63 
Nussbaum acknowledges that there is something problematic about a 
government’s treating preferentially only certain “conceptions of the good” 
that it characterizes as “religions,” while dis-preferring other moral 
commitments that it characterizes as “secular” (philosophical 
understandings, for example). She elides this problem, however, noting 
simply her acceptance that: “. . .from a practical political standpoint it seems 
likely that we have two choices only: either to give religious free exercise 
special protection, or to give nobody any special protection.”64 Her own 
choice is to favor “our traditional stance of giving religion special deference, 
on the grounds that minority religions have been especially vulnerable in all 
societies and are consequently in need of this special protection.”65 
Nussbaum raises the question: “Does sex discrimination all by itself 
supply the state with a compelling interest in legal change, or only 
discrimination that denies women certain fundamental rights?” This, she 
observes, is “the most difficult issue the political liberal has to face.”66 Her 
proposal for resolution of the difficulty involves an embrace of what – in a 
misreading – she defines as the approach embodied in the federal statute 
enacted by the United States Congress in 1993, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).67 That statute, which Nussbaum urges political 
liberals to endorse, does, as she recognizes, provide maximal protection for 
“religious liberty.” Nussbaum errs, however, in reading that protection as 
extending to “religious groups,” as the statutory language clearly protects the 
religious liberty of “individuals” rather than that of groups. Thus, in her 
endorsement of RFRA, Nussbaum is effectively urging liberalism’s embrace 
                                                          
 62  Okin, supra note 1, at 9-10.  
 63  Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR 
WOMEN? 105, 105-14 (Susan Moller Okin et al. eds., 1999).  
 64  Id. at 111. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb4 (1993). 
This act’s applicability to federal law was upheld in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
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of a religious-group protection even more extraordinarily heightened than 
the protection actually provided by that statute. 
To appreciate Nussbaum’s readiness to compromise women’s interests, 
let us accept her misreading of RFRA as if it were accurate. From her 
perspective, RFRA permits substantial burdening of religion (i.e., of 
institutionalized religions or of religious groups) only when government can 
prove both that a “compelling interest” justifies the burdening and that no 
less-restrictive alternative form of regulation is available to government. The 
protection of liberty afforded religions by this “compelling interest” 
requirement contrasts strikingly with the far more limited protection of 
women’s liberty interests in American law. Neither any Federal statute nor 
the U.S. Constitution delivers protection of women’s liberty at the same high 
level as the protection afforded to religions by RFRA. Thus, while 
Nussbaum expresses concern for women’s “fundamental rights,” that 
concern is transparently belied by her endorsement of a Constitutional and 
statutory scheme within which, during the years prior to her writing, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had repudiated its earlier recognition that women have a 
“fundamental right” to abortion, and had refused to maintain its earlier-
applied “compelling interest” standard to regulation of abortion.68 
What exactly does Nussbaum think should happen when religious 
liberty claims conflict with women’s interests in equality? Nussbaum will 
not unequivocally criticize governmental preferencing of patriarchal 
religions that oppose both female autonomy and equality. Touching on the 
issue of polygamy that had so distressed Susan Okin, Nussbaum makes clear 
that her own RFRA-based analysis of polygamy will be more complex than 
Okin’s approach, less confident that polygamy should be broadly 
condemned by liberalism in order to protect women’s equality. Nussbaum 
will, instead, give great weight to the religious interests asserted to support 
polygamy. Governmental prohibition of polygamy may amount to a 
“substantial burdening” of religious freedom by an insufficiently justified 
government – depending on context, she notes.69 
Nussbaum’s readiness to prefer religions’ interests to women’s is 
evident in this writing of 1999, and it prefigures the position that she would 
later adopt in her examination of the veil controversy. For now, it should be 
noted that her comments failed to engage with the legal and political 
contextual realities surrounding conflicts between “religious rights” claims 
and “women’s equality” claims. Her highly abstract approach was naïve and 
incomplete in its rendering of legal doctrine. Nussbaum showed no 
awareness at all, for example, of the degree to which RFRA had sought to 
privilege religious persons far beyond what had ever been required by the 
                                                          
 68  Nussbaum, supra note 63, at 112. 
 69  Id. at 141, n.5. 
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Free Exercise of the U.S. Constitution.70 She made no mention, either, of the 
extraordinary “accommodations” that had been delivered to religious 
organizations in the decade prior to her writing, through Supreme Court 
interpretations of the Establishment Clause that had significantly altered the 
church-state balance in the United States. Nussbaum ignored the extensive 
empowerment of religions that was well underway by 1999, and the negative 
implications of that empowerment with regard to women’s interests.71 
In 2007, several years after Nussbaum had responded to Okin, Joan 
Wallach Scott’s The Politics of the Veil, offered a book-length treatment of 
the French schoolgirls veiling controversy.72 Scott intended this work to be 
understood as making propositions about democratic political structures and 
about liberalism in general. She identified the implications of her specific 
focus: “[T]he case of the French headscarf law is not just a local story. It 
allows us to think more broadly about the terms on which democratic 
polities (including our own) are organized, and to analyze critically the ways 
in which the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ undermines the very 
democracy it is meant to promote.”73 In light of her asserted interest in 
thinking broadly and critically, it is somewhat surprising that Scott’s book 
makes no reference whatsoever to Okin’s earlier engagement with French 
politics relating to Muslim practices and their meanings for women, or to 
Okin’s earlier challenges to multiculturalist-liberalism. Likewise, Scott 
makes no reference to Nussbaum. Had she engaged explicitly with these 
predecessors, however, Scott would definitely have located herself in 
Nussbaum’s camp rather than in Okin’s. 
Scott’s writing usefully and chronologically documents much of the 
history of the French “headscarf” controversy (as Scott references it and as it 
came to be characterized in media coverage). Her account records 
developments at three stages. 
Looking first at events of 1989, Scott records the expulsion of three 
veil-wearing girls by the principal of their middle-school (acting to enforce 
laïcité, the particularly secularist French approach to separation of church 
and state), and the rejection of that interpretation of laïcité a month later, by 
the highest administrative court in France, the Conseil d’Etat. The Conseil 
                                                          
 70  For further discussion of the effect of RFRA, see Marie Ashe, Women’s Wrongs, 
Religions’ Rights: Women, Free Exercise, and Establishment in American Law, 21 TEMP. POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 163, 201 (2011). For an account of the effects and implications of recent 
state-law versions of RFRA, see Marci Hamilton, The New Wave of Extreme State Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Legislation: Why It’s Dangerous, FINDLAW (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/hamilton/20101014.html. 
 71  For a discussion of this virtual revolution in doctrine, see generally Ashe, supra note 
70, at 201-02.  
 72  JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL (2007). 
 73  Id. at 182. 
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took the position that the wearing of the hijab by students in public schools 
did not necessarily violate the principle of laïcité, and that before expelling 
students on the basis of religious dress, local school authorities would have 
to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the particular attire was 
“ostentatious or polemical,” and whether the dress involved “pressure, 
provocation, proselytism, or propaganda.”74 Scott also documents the 
extremely unfavorable social conditions in which many North African 
immigrants and their children were living in France in the 1980s and into the 
21st-century. She makes clear that her analysis will highlight the racism that 
– historically, and into the 21st-century – characterized France’s treatment of 
its Muslim citizens – a racism that she saw as having motivated the move for 
a hijab ban. (While she notes the fact that “45 percent of Muslims polled at 
the time agreed that the hijab should not be worn in school”75 Scott gives no 
particular weight to that observation.) 
The action of the Conseil quieted the controversy for a few years, but a 
second stage of the hijab controversy occurred in 1994, following the 
elections that brought rightist politicians into office, when a decree of the 
Ministry of Education specified that all “ostentatious” forms of religious 
dress would be barred in all schools. Dress would be seen as “ostentatious” 
if it “introduce[d] difference and discrimination into an educational 
community . . . .”76 Following the policy’s announcement, sixty-nine girls 
wearing hijabs were expelled from their public schools. 
Intense public controversy followed the announcement of the hijab ban. 
Scott notes that while ban-supporters occupied the full range of the political 
spectrum, they were unified in their perception of a connection between 
ongoing events in France and “the violent civil war then raging in 
Algeria.”77 They were similarly unified in their belief that: “One could not 
tolerate the expression of a religiosity that was itself inherently intolerant 
and oppressive.”78 She provides very limited detail, however, about the 
specific events in France that prompted this “linkage,” and she provides no 
detail about the contemporaneous 1990s Algerian civil war during which 
Islamist radicals waged a terror campaign against civilians opposed to their 
theocratic project, targeting women very particularly, with veiling-mandates 
that were harshly enforced. 
The third state of the controversy, as reported by Scott, occurred in 
2003, when (incident to the heightening of security measures in Western 
nations after September 2001) then-President Jacques Chirac appointed the 
                                                          
 74  Id. at 24-25. 
 75  Id. at 26. 
 76  Id. at 27. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. 
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Stasi Commission to examine the question of whether a national law should 
be enacted to prohibit the wearing in schools of any garb signifying religious 
affiliation. In December 2003, the Stasi Commission recommended 
legislation that would have addressed numerous issues relating to 
discrimination against France’s Muslim population. The recommendations 
included: prohibiting all “conspicuous” signs of religious affiliation in public 
schools; teaching the history and philosophy of religions in schools; 
establishing a national Islamic Studies school; increasing numbers of 
Muslim chaplains in French hospitals and prisons; providing alternatives to 
pork on menus in schools, prisons, and hospital cafeterias; and, recognizing 
Yom Kippur and Aid-El-Kebir as national holidays.”79 In fact, the only 
Commission recommendation accepted by President Chirac and 
subsequently enacted into law – in 2004 – was the prohibition of wearing 
“conspicuous” signs of religious affiliation in public schools. 
Most of Scott’s book is devoted to her interpretation of the 
intensification of regulation that occurred between 1989 and 2004. She 
argues that the regulation is directly traceable to the racism that 
characterized the French history of occupation in Northern Africa, and that 
lingers as a legacy of that shameful history. Scott develops this argument by 
reviewing the history of French colonialism in Northern Africa – an 
imperialist project in which the official assimilation policy toward the 
indigenous population (Arab as well as Berber) was characterized by certain 
colonials as a “civilizing mission”; and by others as a mission impossible 
because of the Arabs’ alleged “difference” from the French. She tracks a 
history of French insistence on difference, and of racist segregation of Arabs 
and Berbers through the 19th century and through the first half of the 20th 
century.80 
Scott’s study includes an exploration of the complexity of meanings 
carried by Muslim women’s veils during the colonizing period, during the 
20th century, and at the present time. (Indeed, Scott presents this complexity 
so effectively, making very clear the necessarily political meanings of the 
veil, that her bottom-line opposition to the ban is less than fully intelligible.) 
Invoking interpretative work concerning representations of North African 
Muslims by Europeans, she documents the prominence of Muslim women’s 
veils in the imaginations of French colonialists in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries.81 But she emphasizes particularly the differing political meanings 
that the veil carried for both French and Algerians during the Algerian War 
of 1954-1962. 
Scott proposes that the veil “was first associated with dangerous 
                                                          
 79  Id. at 34. 
 80  Id. at 53. 
 81  Id. at 56-61. For representative images see ALLOULA, supra note 10.  
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militancy” during the Algerian War because of its association with the pro-
independence National Liberation Front and because of its usefulness for the 
concealment and transport of weapons and bombs by militant Algerian 
women and men. For the French, it had a simple and political meaning 
during that war period: it signified danger and threat. For the Algerians, on 
the other hand, the veil carried multiple meanings. Scott sums up: 
If the veil had one symbolic meaning for defenders of French 
rule, it had several conflicting meanings for the resisters. It was, 
to be sure, a refusal of French appropriation of the country, a 
way of insisting on an independent identity for Algerians. But 
many of the leaders of the nationalist-socialist revolution also 
thought of themselves as modernizers. For them to the veil was a 
sign of backwardness that must eventually be overcome—but on 
Algerian, not French, terms. In addition, the veil became a 
useful instrument in the war against the French, permitting the 
clandestine transport of arms and bombs by militants of both 
sexes.82 
 With the conclusion of the Algerian War, the veil took on more 
complicated meanings: 
For the French, it continued to stand for the backwardness of 
Algeria, but it was also a sign of the frustration, even the 
humiliation, of France. It was the piece of cloth that represented 
the antithesis of the tricolore, and the failure of the civilizing 
mission. Immediately after the war, for the new leadership of the 
Algerian nation, the veil become a contested sign of the future 
direction of the country . . . [T]he tension has continued in 
different forms to the present day, when a secular military 
government supported by France has managed for the moment 
at least to subdue a powerful challenge, which erupted into civil 
war in the 1990s, from Islamists (with external support from 
Saudi Arabia and elsewhere), among whose goals is veiling the 
women of Algeria.”83 
In her contextualizing of the controversy over the hijab in French 
schools, Scott records an important sociological reality that she calls the 
“massification” of education in France.84 An expectation of nearly universal 
                                                          
 82  SCOTT, supra note 72, at 62-63; see SCOTT, supra note 72, at 63-67 (referencing 
FRANTZ FANON, A DYING COLONIALISM (Haakar Chevalier trans., 1965)). For additional 
information about Fanon’s understandings of the veil, see generally Rita A. Faulkner, Assia 
Djebar, Frantz Fanon, Women, Veils, and Land, 70 WORLD LITERATURE TODAY 847 (1996).  
 83  SCOTT, supra note 72, at 66-67. 
 84  Id. at 108 (invoking the work of education sociologist François Dubet). 
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lycée (high school) attendance developed in France in the 1970s. The 
extension of education to the masses produced drastic overcrowding in 
French schools and was accompanied by reduced state support of national 
education. It also introduced great challenges for teachers. As “youth 
culture” entered the schools after 1968, and replaced the relative uniformity 
and rigidity of the earlier lycées, teachers encountered discipline problems 
that resulted in a heightened sense of inadequacy – especially in schools 
located in poorer districts. Thus, the teachers’ unions in France strongly 
supported the hijab ban, seeing it as something that would likely reduce 
conflict among students by eliminating religious-identifiers that might 
occasion conflict in schools.85 
While Scott reports on both the socially-divisive symbolizing power of 
the hijab and the reality of deep social conflict about it, her own political 
analysis is limited to an insistence that the ban was motivated by French 
racism. She pays little attention to the 1990s “bloody decade” in Algeria, 
when about 130,000 people lost their lives, mostly at the hands of Islamic 
armed groups who had issued warnings that women and girls should veil or 
face death. She does not mention the fact that, as Muslim fundamentalists 
were facing state repression, a number of them obtained political asylum in 
Europe (notably in Britain, Germany, and France) and imported their dress 
code diktats among French religious and ethnic minorities, hence fueling the 
spread of hijabs. She notes, but gives little attention to the support of the ban 
within the French Muslim population. Moreover, she elides the Stasi 
Commission’s having been influenced by French girls of Muslim heritage 
who reported that they would prefer not to wear the headscarf, but felt 
required to do so because of pressure from their parents or brothers.86 While 
she records the rise of right-wing politics in France during the relevant 
period, rather than accurately characterizing the ban campaign as something 
used by racist right-wing politicians, she characterizes it as having been 
motivated by racism. Scott’s political analysis is one-dimensional. Her work 
expresses a disabled liberal vision – one focused and lingering on racism 
alone.87 While venturing to engage with “the politics of the veil,” Scott 
                                                          
 85  Id. at 113-15. 
 86  Cf. Karima Bennoune, The Law of the Republic Versus the ‘Law of the Brothers’: A 
Story of France’s Law Banning Religious Symbols in Public Schools, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY STORIES 156, 162 (Deena Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009) (identifying numerous 
supporters of the law “from across the political spectrum [including] principled champions of 
secularism, leftwing anti-fundamentalists and progressive women’s rights campaigners….”) 
[hereinafter Bennoune, Law of the Republic]; SCOTT, supra note 72, at 66-67. 
 87  Pertinent here are the reports by Karima Bennoune of comments made by Algerian 
feminists and secularists or their allies, whom Bennoune interviewed, contradicting Scott’s 
perception of racism. Bennoune reports that “Favret-Saada acerbically notes: ‘[T]he Islamists 
are happy to meet Europeans who are so naïve . . . and talk only about [religious] 
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entirely failed to attend to the threat that many French Muslims discerned as 
they took in the reality of an Algerian Islamist movement whose agenda – 
like that of fundamentalist religions’ movements across the globe – included 
control of women by mandatory veiling. Thus, Scott’s analysis of the 
“politics of the veil” is disappointingly naïve. 
During 2010, both Martha Nussbaum and Joan Wallach Scott had 
occasion to further articulate their positions about veiling. In her essay, 
Veiled Threats?,88 Nussbaum remained abstractedly non-political. 
Reviewing European legislative decisions to ban or not-to-ban burqas and/or 
hijab, Nussbaum urged “accommodations” of religions. Focusing on the 
burqa, she identified five interests that are sometimes asserted to justify 
bans: interests in security; interests in supporting transparency and 
reciprocity in relations between citizens; interests in avoiding objectification 
of women; interests in protecting women against coercions; and public 
health interests. Nussbaum concluded, highly summarily, that “[a]ll five 
arguments89 are discriminatory.”90 
 In August 2010, Scott commented on the French burqa ban that had 
been enacted during the prior month. “What is it about covered women that 
so draws the ire and fear of so many, some western feminists included?,”91 
she asked, feigning guilelessness and as if the answer were not obvious. 
Extrapolating from hijab to burqa, and reiterating her earlier themes, Scott 
refused to confront the entirely justified “ire and fear of so many . . . .” That 
ire and fear affected Susan Okin: ire and fear not only about Islamist and 
other religious fundamentalisms, but also ire and fear provoked by the 
ruthless practice of multiculturalist-liberalism. A few months earlier Scott 
                                                          
discrimination.’ Bennoune, Law of the Republic, supra note 86, at 169 (quoting interview with 
Jeanne Favret-Saada, in Marseille, France (June 11, 2007)). Zazi Sadou opines that ‘those who 
see [the French law] only as racism do not understand the fundamentalists and the pro-veil 
campaign. Hence, they understand the veil only as a cultural sign, but not as an ideological 
uniform.’ It is perhaps logical that this political matrix is more visible to critics of Muslim 
heritage than to Western liberals and human rights advocates. Id. (quoting interview with Zazi 
Sadou, in Marseille, France (June 11, 2007)). As Mimouna Hadjam explains: ‘We didn’t 
discover Islamic fundamentalism on September 11, 2001. We have been living with it for 20 
years.’” Id. (quoting interview with Mimouna Hadjam, in Paris, France (June 12, 2007)).  
 88  Martha Nussbaum, Veiled Threats?, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/veiled-threats/. 
 89  Nussbaum appears to have forgotten that the Stasi Commission report justified its 
recommendations to ban the veil in schools by stating: “[T]he question is no longer one of 
freedom of conscience but one of public order.” For a summary of the Stasi Commission’s 
main conclusions see Extraits du Rapport de la Commission STASI sur la laïcité, 8 
PYRAMIDES 107, ¶ 81 (2004), available at http://pyramides.revues.org/381. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Joan Wallach Scott, France’s Ban on the Islamic Veil Has Little To Do With Female 
Emancipation, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/aug/26/france-ban-islamic-veil/.  
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had herself made crystal-clear the implications of that practice. 
On April 8, 2010, the controversial European Muslim Tariq Ramadan 
made his first public appearance in the United States. Reporting on the panel 
discussion in New York City in which Ramadan had participated,92 Peter 
Schmidt noted: 
[W]hen the discussion turned to the longstanding controversy 
over Mr. Ramadan’s refusal to call for an outright ban on the 
stoning of Muslim women for adultery and [his] insistence that 
there should instead be a moratorium on stoning in general while 
Muslim jurists discuss whether it should continue. . .[his] fellow 
panelist, Joan Wallach Scott, a professor of social science at the 
Institute for Advanced Study. . .who identified herself as a 
feminist, said, “I actually think that his solution to the problem 
is not a bad one,” because an end to stoning cannot be imposed 
on the Muslim world by the West.93 
What could more strongly express the uselessness of multiculturalist-
liberalism? Scott forgets something perhaps entirely obvious, certainly well-
understood by numerous women’s rights advocates in Muslim countries: that 
it is neither racist nor imperialist to condemn, with no reservation, the 
stoning of women. 
B. Liberal Monocular-ism: Leila Ahmed and Marnia Lazreg 
While disappointed in the lack of historicism in the writings of Scott 
and Nussbaum, we do not have that complaint about Leila Ahmed’s latest 
book.94 Ahmed, who has previously produced groundbreaking work on 
women and Islam, sets to carefully map out “how and why the veiling 
revolution occurred, and what the appeal, methods, and driving forces of the 
Islamist movement were,”95 focusing on the “veil’s resurgence” in the 
Egyptian context since the 1950s. She demonstrates that case studies focused 
on a single society are critical for informing readers about the sociological, 
political, and social undercurrents that shape each national context. 
Echoing here Scott’s understanding that “the case of the French 
                                                          
 92  Peter Schmidt, Tariq Ramadan Gets the American Debate He Says He Craved, 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 9, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Tariq-Ramadan-
Gets-the/65011.  
 93  Id.; see Panel Discussion on Secularism, Islam, and Democracy with Tariq Ramadan, 
Dalia Mogahed, George Packer, Joan Wallach Scott, and Jacob Weisberg, CSPAN-2 (Apr. 
18, 2012), http://www.booktv.org (for Joan Scott’s comments regarding the stoning issue, see 
segment 48:00-49:32). 
 94  LEILA AHMED, A QUIET REVOLUTION: THE VEIL’S RESURGENCE FROM THE MIDDLE 
EAST TO AMERICA (2011). 
 95  Id. at 229. 
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headscarf is not just a local story,”96 Ahmed is aware that localized 
developments often contribute to shaping a broader reality. Ahmed’s new 
book attends not only to how the Muslim Brotherhood has successfully 
promoted the veil in Egypt, but also to how the Brotherhood has influenced 
and shaped debates about, and practices of, veiling in the North American 
context. Ahmed provides a detailed account of Egyptian Islamists’ efforts to 
export not only their preferred dress codes but also their particular model of 
Islam, and the implications that these efforts have had globally, and, 
particularly, in the United States. 
Ahmed discusses the political project behind the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
unremitting promotion of dress codes for women over several decades. The 
Brotherhood’s goal has been to promote “the Islamist form of religious 
belief and practice – along with its visual accompaniment, the hijab and 
Muslim dress for women.”97 As Ahmed attests, the primacy of the religious 
over the public sphere was clearly established in Egypt by the early 1990s, 
with the veil – as a visual marker of the Brotherhood’s success – having 
spread from its initial “forceful appearance” in the 1970s, to its “acceptance 
across the majority of Egyptian society. . .by the end of the 1990s.”98 
Referencing Linda Herrera’s work,99 Ahmed notes that “for girls and 
women, the hijab and the teachings of conservative forms of Islam (that is, 
the practices of Islamism) had become the normative, expected, and even 
desired practice for many.”100 We are troubled by Ahmed’s apparent 
conflation of tenets of “Islamism” (that is, beliefs and commitments of 
fundamentalist extremists sometimes designated as the “Muslim religious 
right”) and “conservative” approaches to religion. We dispute her suggestion 
that endorsing culturally- or socially-conservative views is equivalent to 
supporting the religious far-right.101 And, as we will further explain, this is 
not the only slippage we find in Ahmed’s book. 
                                                          
 96  SCOTT, supra note 72, at 182. 
 97  AHMED, supra note 94, at 155. 
 98  Id. at 11. 
 99  Id. at 147 (citing Linda Herrera, Islamization and Education in Egypt: Between 
Politics, Culture, and the Market, in MODERNIZING ISLAM: RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST (John L. Esposito and François Burgat eds., 2003)). 
 100  AHMED, supra note 94, at 147. 
 101  Ahmed is not the only voice conflating conservative beliefs with beliefs and practices 
promoted by the Muslim religious right. Yet, we wish to point out that many norms imposed 
by fundamentalist politico-religious forces do violate the norms followed by traditional, 
conservative people. For example, the systematic destruction in the summer 2012 of Sufi 
shrines by militants associated with the extremist group Ansar Dine in Northern Mali, in 
Timbuktu in particular, is a case in point where century-old traditional worship sites are 
targeted as sacrilegious. See Ansar Dine Islamists destroy ‘legendary’ Timbuktu mosque, 
FRANCE 24 (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.france24.com/en/20120702-mali-timbuktu-unesco-
heritage-site-ansar-dine-islamists-destroy-legendary-mosque. 
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Throughout the Muslim world – with Egypt being no exception – 
generations of Muslim scholars have thoroughly debated the contested issue 
of whether veiling is mandatory in Islam. But, in keeping with Islamist 
beliefs, the Muslim Brotherhood squarely defines veil-wearing as the 
expression of a religious obligation. In fact, the not-so-innocent correlations 
that equate Muslim women with veiled women, and veiled women with 
piety and religious devotion – and that dominate current public perceptions 
in the West as well as in many Muslim-majority countries – actually attest to 
the success of Islamist rhetoric.102 Ahmed shows that the Muslim 
Brotherhood relied on potent arguments and used a variety of strategies to 
achieve the “profound and pervasive transformation in the norms and 
practices of Islam”103 that it has accomplished. The Brotherhood’s campaign 
to “deliberately, actively, and systematically”104 promote “the veil” has 
included a combination of theological justification and peer pressure. 
Ahmed notes that “activists enthusiastically set out to ‘educate their 
uninformed peers’ about the proper practice of Islam and their proper duties 
as Muslims,”105 and that their proselytizing was made more potent by 
personal connections. Relying on fieldwork of Carrie Rosefsky Wickham,106 
Ahmed quotes Wickham’s report of the account given by an “Islamist 
woman” whom she had interviewed: “We buy the khimar for those who 
can’t afford it, or one of us gets the material and another one sews it. When a 
woman is ready to make the decision [to veil], we try to get things ready 
very quickly, before she changes her mind.”107 
Ahmed concludes: “Peer pressure and gentle albeit insidiously powerful 
coercion toward social conformity and the acceptance of ‘correct’ religious 
practice (‘Isn’t it proper, following the path of the Prophet?’) clearly were all 
brought into play in the process of Islamists da’wa108 and outreach in regard 
                                                          
 102  As Ahmed notes, many Americans and Europeans “assume [that] wearing the hijab is 
just what devout, observant Muslims do” – while, at least at the onset of her research on the 
veil’s resurgence, in her own eyes and in the eyes of her close colleague (a “well-known 
feminist of Muslim background”), “the hijab’s presence meant not just piety – for we both 
knew many women in our home societies who were deeply devout yet never wore hijab. 
Rather, to us, it plainly signaled the presence of Islamism.” AHMED, supra note 94, at 3. 
 103  Id. at 147. 
 104  Id. at 151. 
 105  Id. at 3 (quoting CARRIE ROSEFSKY WICKHAM, MOBILIZING ISLAM: RELIGION, 
ACTIVISM, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN EGYPT 15, 125-27 (2002)). 
 106  WICKHAM, supra note 105, at 125-27.  
 107  Khimar refers to a garment “covering hair, neck, and torso.” AHMED, supra note 94, at 
152; WICKHAM, supra note 105, at 125-27. 
 108  To perform da‘wa is to awaken others to Islam. Progressive Muslims may engage in 
da’wa (for example through interfaith engagement, publications, etc.) but simply consider it as 
an added virtue, while it is a perceived obligation for Islamists; one of the ways through which 
one proselytizes in Islamist networks is charity work. WICKHAM, supra note 105, at 150. 
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to Islamic dress.”109 
The reference to “gentle. . .coercion” seems to eclipse the less “gentle” 
means used at times by Islamists, although Ahmed does allude to the 
“growing atmosphere of repression” in Egypt when the “legal system was 
used by Islamist lawyers to, in effect, harass and persecute people who did 
not share [their] views”110 and to the “violence that began to tear at the 
country in the early 1990s.” In such a polarized environment (and at a time 
when death threats were issued by Islamists against personalities and 
prominent intellectuals111), it is clear that Islamist proponents of the veil 
were often resorting to non-”gentle” means to convince girls and women to 
adopt their version of an “Islamic dress.” Further, Ahmed admits that even 
in the US context of the early 2000s, this seemingly “gentle” social pressure 
could amount to a rather pressuring atmosphere – as she recalls: “When I 
first attended an ISNA112 convention I had found it impossibly 
uncomfortable not to wear a scarf myself, since every other female there 
seemingly was covered.”113 
Ahmed’s references to “Islamic dress” throughout most of her the book 
could suggest that she had uncritically endorsed the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
views that there exists an “Islamic” dress code distinct, perhaps, from a 
Christian dress code, a Jewish dress code, or a secular dress code. These 
references might induce readers to believe that because fundamentalist 
extremists have fashioned an “Islamist” dress code (mandated by/deemed 
necessary in their selective interpretation of scriptures), this particular dress 
code is in effect “Islamic” (as mandated by Islam114). But Ahmed does point 
                                                          
 109  AHMED, supra note 94, at 152-53. 
 110  Attempts by Islamists to impose religiously-justified censorship in Egypt have 
included repeated efforts to ban the Thousand and One Nights in the 1980s and as late as 2010. 
See generally AHMED, supra note 94, at 143-45. Even more recently, Islamist lawyers sued 
several prominent artists (writers, actors and film directors) accusing them of defaming Islam. 
Egypt to Ban Classic “1001 Nights”?, CARNAL NATION (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://carnalnation.com/content/54647/4/egypt-ban-classic-1001-nights; Mohamed Abul Soud 
& Fathyia el-Dakhakhni, Lawyers Call for Ban on “1001 Nights”, EGYPT INDEPENDENT (Apr. 
22 2010), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/lawyers-call-ban-1001-nights; see Egypt 
Prosecutor Dismisses ‘Arabian Nights’ Ban, AFP (June 8, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hoEUiVate2OxeGdnQzGAL1yoLsk; 
see also Ati Metwaly, Islamists on Art, MAJALLA (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://www.majalla.com/eng/2012/04/article55231343.  
 111  AHMED, supra note 94, at 4, 142-44. 
 112  “ISNA” is the acronym for Islamic Society of North America. ISLAMIC SOC’Y OF N. 
AM., http://www.isna.net/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).  
 113  AHMED, supra note 94, at 247.  
 114  For a concise summary of the references to “Hijab” in the Qu’ran and the ensuing 
debate about whether veiling is religiously-required, see Isa, supra note 13. Scholars and 
theologians who have argued that veiling is not a religious requirement include Pakistani-
American Riffat Hassan. See Riffat Hassan, The Quran on the Issue of Modesty, EXPRESS 
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out that the type of so-called “religious clothing” promoted by the 
Brotherhood and other Islamist groups in Egypt relied, in fact, on what we 
would term an “invention of tradition.” The popularizing of such a “Muslim 
uniform” has in fact meant that the range of traditional indigenous dress 
styles for women has narrowed over the last couple of decades – from Egypt 
to the USA, as well as across the world.115 Further, the spreading of the veil 
fulfills:  
the vision and the world that Islamists were tirelessly working to 
bring into being . . . ‘First, Islam will spread through the 
neighborhoods, and then to Egyptian society as a whole, and 
then to the Egyptian state, and then to other Muslim countries, 
and then to countries in which Muslims were formerly rulers, 
and then to other parts of the world, including Europe and the 
United States.’116 
The exponential success of the veil, which Ahmed documents, is 
undoubtedly linked to the multiplicity of claims employed by activists 
(including veil-wearing women as well as preachers), who rely on arguments 
ranging from theological justifications to anti-imperialist rhetoric,117 and 
who adopt strategies that boost the generational divide by fueling younger 
Muslim women with a sense of empowerment toward their elders (because 
young women now feel they know the proper way of Islam).118 
Further, the success of the veil’s resurgence is linked to the tenacity of 
                                                          
TRIBUNE (July 13, 2010), http://tribune.com.pk/story/27362/the-qurn-on-the-issue-of-
modesty/.  
 115  See Anissa Hélie, Problematizing “Autonomy” and “Tradition” with Regard to 
Veiling, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 106-20 (2013); see also WLUML Exhibition: Dress 
Codes & Modes, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS (Jan. 19, 2010), 
http://www.wluml.org/node/5598 (documenting the fading geographical and historical 
diversity of female clothing across Muslim contexts). 
 116  AHMED, supra note 94, at 154. 
 117  The anti-Western imperialism rhetoric (not a specifically Egyptian discourse by any 
means) has been consistently employed by Islamists. For example, in the mid-1970s when the 
responses given by Williams’ Egyptian interviewees suggest that “adopting the hijab 
sometimes at least connoted a turning away from and even an outright rejection of the West 
and of its ways.” AHMED, supra note 94, at 88 (citing John Alden Williams, Veiling in Egypt 
as a Political and Social Phenomenon, in ISLAM AND DEVELOPMENT, RELIGION AND SOCIO-
POLITICAL CHANGE (John L. Esposito ed.,1980)); see also AHMED, supra note 94, at 85-89. 
The same anti-Western imperialism rhetoric is at play in early 21st century America, as Ahmed 
attests, who attends Friday prayers at a local mosque and hears a sermon eulogizing Al-Banna. 
Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood was praised “in particular for his stand 
against Western imperialism.” Ahmed notes: “the preacher delivered his address in the 
vehement Arabic anti-imperialist rhetoric familiar to me from my youth. I had not heard such 
speech since I left Egypt” [in the late 1960s]. Id. at 6. 
 118  See AHMED, supra note 94, at 150-51. 
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advocates who enforce their message through social networks of Islamists. 
These networks are the backbone of the “Islamic Awakening.”119 They have 
indeed proven to be extremely efficient in their proselytizing across Muslim 
societies and in Diaspora communities (in part because these networks offer 
tangible benefits to many Muslim communities’ members – including, as 
Ahmed notes, pro-bono legal services, matrimonial match- making; and 
other services. But we find Ahmed’s tone surprisingly uncritical when, 
borrowing from Wickham, she affords legitimacy to the claim that “activism 
and a sense of obligation and responsibility to reform and improve society” 
are “defining features” of Islamist activists.120 Endorsing the views 
popularized by other academics such as Azza Karam (who suggests that “an 
Islamist must be committed to active engagement in the quest for a more 
Islamic and just society”121), Ahmed seems to agree with the assertion that 
Islamists strive to embody “the Islamist core commitment to activism in 
pursuit of social justice.”122 What is problematic here is not so much the 
recognition that Islamists – in Egypt or the USA or elsewhere – are 
committed activists, but rather the reference to an activism seemingly devoid 
of political meaning and stripped of its theocratic agenda.123 To refer to a 
“social justice” project geared toward “reforming” and “improving” society 
without further qualifying, for example, the gendered implications of an 
Islamist version of “social justice” – or its implications for those deemed 
unorthodox – seems perplexing. 
Shifting her attention to North America, Ahmed devotes the second 
section of her book to Muslims in the United States. She reports on the first 
waves of immigration; on Islam’s appeal to African-Americans since the 
1970s;124 on the rise of Islamist activism since the 1960s; and, on anti-
Muslim racism and the impact of government “anti-terrorism” measures on 
peaceful citizens of Muslim heritage post-9/11.125 Her contribution is 
particularly important here in that she underscores the importance of 
                                                          
 119  Id. at 9 (explaining terminology). 
 120  Id. at 148. 
 121  Id. at 9 (quoting AZZA KARAM, TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ISLAM: RELIGION, 
IDEOLOGY AND POWER 5-7 (2004)). 
 122  AHMED, supra note 94, at 281-82. 
 123  In fact, as Women Living Under Muslim Laws has highlighted, Islamist projects are 
far from pursuing an innocuous “social justice” agenda: at their core, Islamists’ “main target is 
the internal democratic opposition to their theocratic project and to their project of controlling 
all aspects of society in the name of religion, including education, the legal system, youth 
services, etc.” WLUML Statement to the World Social Forum – Appeal Against 
Fundamentalisms, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAW (Jan. 21, 2005), 
http://www.wluml.org/node/1850. 
 124  See AHMED, supra note 94, at 171-75. 
 125  Id. at 193-96. 
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transnational funding in the development of modern jihadism, as she tracks 
“the growing presence of the hijab in America . . .along with that of 
Islamism, and what their trajectories might be in America and the West.”126 
The general public often underestimates the links between some local or 
national organizations that purport to simply uphold the “traditional values” 
of their respective Muslim cultures and Islamist organizations worldwide – 
but Ahmed highlights those linkages. She documents how “Islamist forces 
[including] the Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim World League, and the 
Jamaat-i Islami have played key roles in establishing mosques . . . and in 
establishing major and enormously influential Muslim organizations” in the 
US and globally since the 1950s and 1960s.127 She insists particularly on the 
influence of “the Arab Gulf states,” identifying “Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
[as] major donors and supporters of Islamist organizations”128 in the United 
States, especially until the first Gulf War of 1990-1991.129 By doing this, 
Ahmed makes accessible to a wide audience the knowledge (already familiar 
to some researchers and democratic advocates) that Islamist movements are 
part of a transnational political project that is backed up, conceptually and 
financially, by one of the most conservative strands of Islam, Wahhabism 
(which originated from Saudi Arabia). Ahmed especially underscores the 
role of geo-politics, including the alliance between the USA and Saudi 
Arabia130 since the 1980s. She summarizes: 
Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
the United States and Saudi Arabia joined forces, out of their 
shared hatred for the Soviet Union and its “godless empire,” to 
defeat communism in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia encouraged its 
youth to go to Afghanistan to fight the jihad against the Soviet 
Union. In Washington, the Reagan Administration had elevated 
Wahhabism ‘to the status of liberation theology—one that would 
free the region of communism.’131 The jihadists, dubbed 
“freedom fighters,” were ‘trained and equipped by the CIA and 
                                                          
 126  Id. at 197. 
 127  Id. at 155. 
 128  Id. at 188. 
 129  Id. at 187-89. 
 130  It should be noted that even if the political will existed in the US, it would be hard to 
undo those ties when Saudi Arabia is one of the main creditors of the U.S. (“Oil producers” 
collectively – including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lo are collectively ranked 4th among U.S 
creditors.). See Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities of Treasury Securities, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-
chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt. 
 131  AHMED, supra note 94, at 177 (quoting GILLES KEPEL, THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS 
154 (2004)). 
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supported by petro-dollars from the Arabian Peninsula.’ 132 .. . . 
Islamist activists traveled internationally to preach and recruit 
for the jihad. They became the ‘beneficiaries of America’s 
tolerance for anti-communists of any stripe,’ and they circulated 
and recruited freely, including among Muslims in America. 
Altogether, the U.S.’s pursuit of such policies would have the 
effect . . . of turning the United Sates into an ‘Islamist haven.’133 
Ahmed argues that the American Muslim Student Association (MSA, 
set up in 1963) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA, established 
by the MSA in 1981) benefited from “international Islamist links 
and. . .networks,” in particular the emergent Muslim World League, whose 
“objective was unambiguously that of promoting, supporting and Islamism 
worldwide.”134 Along with another Islamist organization, the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR, formed in 1994), these groups are most 
vocal and they have convinced successive U.S. Administrations to accept 
them as the “voice of Muslims.” Ahmed notes that this dangerous trend – i.e. 
mistaking Islamists for Muslims, hence giving legitimacy to extremely 
conservative and far-right religious institutions or individuals – has been 
criticized by non-Islamist American Muslim communities. During the 
1990s, strong criticisms appeared, focused on “the way in which the 
dominant Muslim American organizations were laying claim to be speaking 
for all Muslims when in fact they were not.”135 
With regard to dress codes, Ahmed notes, ISNA and CAIR are 
unequivocal: 
[T]he veil as a religious requirement is absolutely and 
undeviatingly present in the Islam as they represent it. Both 
organizations, for example, typically refer to the hijab as the 
“religiously mandated covering for Muslim women,” and in 
their publications – magazines, pamphlets, books – women 
invariably are shown wearing hijab. The importance of hijab 
was the message that ISNA taught to the young in their schools, 
kindergartens, summer camps, and training camps.136 
Supporting her conclusion that “women’s dress and hijab” are 
“foundational. . .to the Islamist message,”137 Ahmed notes statements made 
                                                          
 132  AHMED, supra note 94, at 177 (quoting GILLES KEPEL, THE ROOTS OF RADICAL 
ISLAM 14 (2005)). 
 133  AHMED, supra note 94, at 177 (quoting KEPEL, supra note 131, at 156). 
 134  Id. at 160-61. 
 135  Id. at 185. 
 136  Id. at 169.  
 137  Id. 
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by Zainab al-Ghazali in an interview in 1985. Al-Ghazali, the woman most 
prominently associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, had founded the 
Muslim Women’s Association in the 1930s, had spent six years in prison 
during the Nassar regime, and for decades was central in work with the 
Brotherhood’s educational activities.138 Al-Ghazali appeared for the 
interview in white robes and “with only her face, hands, and sandal-clad feet 
uncovered.” She told the interviewer: “If you don’t go back to your religion 
and dress as I do, you’ll go to hell. Even if you’re a good Muslim and you 
pray and do what is right, if you dress the way you do all your good deeds 
will be canceled out.”139 
Given Leila Ahmed’s documentation of both the hijacking of power 
already achieved by these Islamist organizations and their emphasis that 
non-observance of the hijab will lead believers to hell, it is surprising to read 
– in Part Two of her book – Ahmed’s tone of optimism about “the 
emergence of a new and dynamic Islamist feminism.”140 Her attitude strikes 
us as overly optimistic, given that many of the new “Islamist feminists” to 
whom she refers are grounded in ISNA and CAIR. We continue to be 
extremely suspicious of any suggestion that Islamism, as a political 
movement whose “foundational” belief relies on gender inequality and the 
subjugation of women, can be merged with feminist aspirations. It seems to 
us naïve that Ahmed can forget her own warning that: “In my own 
experience, Muslim religious authorities, by definition ensconced in power, 
do not listen. Rather, they ignore, silence, or attempt to crush criticisms of 
Islamic views and practices no matter how justified or ethically 
grounded.”141 
In spite of this experience, Ahmed reports that during the last decade, 
and post- 9/11/2001 she came to feel that “we were now apparently in a new 
time in America, as new space seemed to be opening up for fruitful and 
collaborative exchanges between American Muslim religious authorities 
[dominated by Islamists] – now that Muslims found themselves an embattled 
minority needing the support of others – and people speaking from other 
American ethical traditions, religious and non-religious.”142 To support her 
assessment, she notes for example the “quite palpable” changes she observed 
in more recent ISNA conventions, where increased numbers of non-Muslim 
                                                          
 138  See id. at 109-13 (referencing Zaynab al-Ghazali, From Days of My Life Chapter 2, in 
PRINCETON READINGS IN ISLAMIST THOUGHT 276, 283-90 (Roxanne L. Euben & Muhammad 
Qasim Zaman eds., 2009)). 
 139  AHMED, supra note 94, at 113 (citing to Kristin Helmore, Islam and Women: An 
Egyptian Speaks Out, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 26, 1985), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1985/1126/ozena.html). 
 140  AHMED, supra note 94, at 190. 
 141  Id. at 204.  
 142  Id. 
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speakers were welcomed,143 where more controversial topics were addressed 
(e.g., sexual orientation), and where the “sense of male dominance and of 
gender hierarchy as a foundational value that was ostentatiously and 
unapologetically asserted” was now “eroding and being challenged.”144 
We feel that the major shortcoming of Ahmed’s otherwise informative 
and thorough research is that it evades the critical question of whether 
feminists can achieve meaningful and lasting changes when working “from 
within” institutions that are deeply patriarchal and opposed to gender 
equality. Further, she appears to willfully dismiss the fact (documented in 
other contexts) that, beyond “ignoring, silencing or crushing” dissent, 
Islamist organizations can also co-opt dissenters within their communities or 
dissenters’ frameworks of choice. Our concern is not merely hypothetical. 
Islamist organizations have been actively working to co-opt human rights 
discourse and have had some success in their efforts.145 
To support her affirmation that change is on the way, Ahmed relies on 
individual profiles of women, including dynamic Islamist advocates, and on 
what she has learned through having attended ISNA open meetings over 
several years. She first reminds us that “the veil’s meanings are not fixed or 
static across histories and societies.”146 This is true enough – except that it 
never seems to turn out, ultimately, to be in the interests of women. Ahmed 
then takes an additional step – perhaps a step too far – asserting that: 
“Somehow with the rise of Islamism – and quite possibly because activist 
women and wearers of the hijab became directly involved in generating the 
meanings of the hijab – the hijab’s meanings began to break loose from the 
older, historically bounded moorings.”147 
We remain more inclined toward the skepticism initially expressed by 
Ahmed: 
Early in my research, I could not fathom by what process of 
transformation and reforging in the crucible of history the veil, 
widely viewed as the emblem of Islamic patriarchy and 
oppression, had come now to signal a call for gender justice (of 
                                                          
 143  Id. at 241-45. 
 144  Id. at 248. 
 145  Indeed a number of high profile Islamists have been assumed to be – or have even been 
presented as – human rights defenders by mainstream human rights organizations such as 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or the Center for Constitutional Rights in New 
York. For criticism of the collusion of human rights advocates and Islamists, and the risk 
involved in legitimizing Islamists, see Meredith Tax, Women and Islam: An Exchange with 
Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/22/women-islam-exchange-kenneth-roth-
human-rights/. 
 146  AHMED, supra note 94, at 212. 
 147  Id. 
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all things) and a call for equality for minorities.148 
We cannot join her in her view that the veil has simply become a 
“fashion statement” or that it has “emerged today in America as an emblem 
of a call for justice, and even for gender-justice.”149 While it may be seen as 
such by individual wearers, this does not negate its profoundly political 
meaning. The belief that one can “break free of historically bounded 
meanings”150 may be ascribed to individuals and their motives. But there is 
little reason to imagine that it can interrupt the well-funded and powerfully 
Islamist project that Ahmed has documented so well. We are disappointed 
by the narrowness of the political vision evident in Ahmed’s merely-passing 
observation concerning some veil-wearers’ characterizations of the hijab as a 
challenge to the sexism of their own Western societies. Ahmed notes – but 
does not at all probe the present political implications of – the reality that the 
veil could not possibly have such a challenging meaning “in Cairo or 
Karachi or Riyadh or Tehran.”151 Ultimately, we find Ahmed’s optimism to 
be misguided, unsupported and unconvincing. 
Despite the solid findings that she records throughout her book, Ahmed 
appears to lose her way in the last section of the book. The tone of Part Two 
seems to us almost schizophrenically different from that of Part One. After 
having carefully documented the takeover of public debate in the U.S. by 
Islamists who are succeeding in portraying themselves – and their 
interpretation of Islam – as the authentic voice of the American Muslim 
community, Ahmed does acknowledge that “Islamist influence is in fact a 
common feature in the lives of probably the overwhelming majority of the 
most prominent American Muslim activists of our day.”152 At the same time, 
however, she appears unconcerned about continuing risks raised by that 
Islamist dominance – risks that include: in general, Islamists’ constructing 
their interpretation of Islam as the valid religious discourse in the U.S. 
public debate; and, in specific, Islamists’ dictating the meanings attached to 
and propagated by veiling. 
In her attempt to encourage readers’ hopefulness that Islamists’ massive 
credentials in U.S. government, and in public debates, will be effectively 
countered, Ahmed relies heavily on anecdotes about individuals, particularly 
(though not only) on stories about veil-wearing women who rose to positions 
of leadership in the U.S.153 While these individual stories powerfully 
                                                          
 148  Id. at 211. 
 149  Id. at 8, 213. 
 150  Id. at 119. 
 151  Id. at 213. 
 152  Id. at 253. 
 153  Ahmed contrasts these women with their peers in Egypt where, she notes “Islamist 
women who do important work for the organization . . . continue to find themselves 
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underscore the fact that veil-wearing women can indeed be strong and 
assertive, we find it difficult to believe that individual “successes” and 
individuals’ narratives of empowerment necessarily predict advances at a 
collective level. In fact, many movements associated with the religious right 
have co-opted women. Such movements have sometimes responded to 
women’s demands for access to more leadership; sometimes they have 
endorsed or even promoted women’s political participation. But when these 
steps have been taken, they have never departed from the condition that 
women remain political tokens and that patriarchal gender norms persist. 
Ahmed includes – in the range of “engaged Muslims” who make her 
hopeful – individual toe-the-line Islamists; members of the Muslim gay 
group Al-Fatiha; and feminist theologians. She apparently views all of these 
as examples as benefiting from an “Islamist heritage” grounded in 
commitment to “social justice.” But this seems to us highly unpersuasive – 
equivalent to a proposition that “liberation theology” dissidents and Vatican-
based cardinals belong to a single “Catholic social activists” group. We 
consider it puzzling for example that Ahmed finds the experience of a 
lesbian woman of Iranian origin (pen name: Khalida Saed), her involvement 
in Al-Fatiha, and her endorsement of “progressive” Islam to “directly echo 
the Islamist understanding of Islam as centered on the quest for social justice 
and the activist commitment to working to bring this about.”154 It seems that 
Ahmed does not sufficiently unpack the “social justice” project promoted by 
Islamism’s current incarnation in the USA – and it is surprising to see this 
after her having clearly characterized Islamism in the Egyptian contexts as a 
“particular and very political form of Islam.”155 
Further, Ahmed blurs significant political boundaries when she 
proposes that the whole cohort of 21st century “committed and activist 
American Muslims share a number of noteworthy traits”156 – and when she 
points at “the Islamist heritage” as the common basis that “is in many ways 
implicit in some of the traits characteriz[ing] this generation of activists.”157 
She does try at times to distinguish the “more progressive and gender-
conscious Islamic organizations”158 from others who “carefully remain 
within the accepted bounds of orthodox belief.”159 Puzzlingly, however, at 
the same time that Ahmed celebrates the “easy blending of American and 
                                                          
marginalized and unrecognized.” Id. at 257. 
 154  Id. at 282 (referencing Khalida Saed, On the Edge of Belonging, in LIVING ISLAM OUT 
LOUD: AMERICAN MUSLIM WOMEN SPEAK 86, 92 (Saleemah Abdul-Ghafur ed., 2005)). 
 155  Id. at 3. 
 156  Id. at 285. 
 157  Id. at 287. 
 158  Id. at 276. 
 159  Id. at 270. 
HELIE AND ASHE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2013 3:41 PM 
2012] Multiculturalist Liberalism and Harms to Women 39 
Islamist ideals of activism and ethical commitments,”160 she concludes that 
“it is after all Islamism specifically that valorized activism and activism 
explicitly undertaken as committed and visible Muslims in the cause of 
social justice as a fundamental religious obligation” 161 – leaving us 
wondering whether she is intentionally erasing any legacy of a left-oriented 
activism among Muslim communities, or any legacy of the role that the 
notion of secularism played in anti-colonial struggles, in which many of the 
older generations of Muslim immigrants participated. Our feeling is that 
while Leila Ahmed casts a clear-eyed gaze on history, she closes at least one 
eye to that history when she asserts her expectations for the future. 
Marnia Lazreg, in her recent publication, Questioning the Veil,162 
engages with both the history of Muslim veiling and the question about how 
societies and laws should respond to the impasse in liberalism identified by 
Susan Okin. Lazreg expresses frustration with both bans (in France and in 
Turkey) and mandates (in Iran and Saudi Arabia) – relating to the wearing of 
various forms of Muslim veils. Criticizing both prohibitions and mandates, 
she elects to imagine a space within which women would be neither 
forbidden nor compelled with regard to their clothing, and to explore the 
political and ethical aspects of decision-making that women might undertake 
within that space. Along the “existential-philosophical” path that she tracks 
to her position of abstention from both mandates and bans, Larzeg offers 
multiple reasons – all of which are invocable by advocates of regulation or 
prohibition, and none of which reflect moral indecisiveness or cultural 
relativism – as to why women should not wear the veil. Lazreg provides 
resources for a liberalism interested in re-routing itself in order to escape the 
impasse produced by multiculturalist relativism. 
Questioning the Veil is structured in the form of “open letters” to 
Muslim women, whom Lazreg defines as “women-who-wear-the-veil-
because-they-think-it-is-a-religious-obligation-in-Islam”163 or women 
considering adopting the practice of veiling. When she references “the veil,” 
she generally intends to designate the hijab.164 Approaching the veil issue, 
Lazreg identifies her own Muslim family background and her pride in her 
heritage; her having grown up in colonized Algeria (where her mother, aunt, 
and grandmother all wore full-length veils); and, her lack of animus against 
Islam. She also identifies herself as a woman who “do[es] not and will not 
                                                          
 160  Id. at 235. 
 161  Id. at 287. 
 162  See MARNIA LAZREG, QUESTIONING THE VEIL: OPEN LETTERS TO MUSLIM WOMEN 
(2009). 
 163  Id. at 12. 
 164  Id. at 13. 
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wear a veil.”165 Her purpose is to persuade Muslim women that wearing the 
veil is a very bad idea. 
Introducing her work, Lazreg muses on the contributions to the issue of 
veiling – or, more precisely, the issue of re-veiling that has been underway 
since the 1970s – that have been made by other academics in her field of 
sociology. She has found this work inadequate, and she explains that it has 
disappointed her because it is uncritical; fails to give due weight to the 
realities of physical and psychological harm attached to veiling; and shirks 
the responsibility of attending to the broad range of Muslim women’s 
experiences – largely because of an excessive concern not to privilege 
“Westernization.” Because we want to locate Lazreg’s book relative to the 
predecessor contributions made by Okin, Scott, and Nussbaum, it will be 
useful to look carefully at the critique she formulates about the kind of work 
she herself will seek to avoid: 
The reveiling trend coincided with an approach espoused by 
academic feminists that seeks to correct the notion that the veil 
is a sign of “oppression” but in reality makes oppression more 
intellectually acceptable. Although acknowledging that veiling 
may enforce gender inequality, this approach uncritically and 
apologetically foregrounds lower-middle-class women’s stated 
reasons for taking up veiling. Its proponents engage in various 
degrees of sophisticated theoretical hair-splitting in order to 
excavate the operative agency assumed to be lurking behind the 
veil, subverting its use, and turning it into a tool of 
empowerment. The implication is that the “oppressed” are not so 
oppressed after all; they have power. Faced with this newly 
discovered power frontier, the researcher does no more than 
study its manifestation. She finds power in a woman’s decision 
to veil herself, and the veil is hailed as securing a woman’s 
ability to work outside her home, or protecting her husband from 
experiencing jealousy. In bending over backward to “give 
women a voice,” adherents to this approach find it necessary to 
dismiss the reality of the women who object to veiling. These 
are routinely disposed of as being “elite,” “upper class,” and 
“Westernized.” Implicitly, apologists for veiling seek to 
disempower local women who have a different understanding of 
veiling from theirs and to delegitimize these women’s views 
while at the same time validating their own as those of 
dispassionate outsiders, intent upon discovering the truth of 
veiling or reveiling against the “Westernized” native . . . [This] 
represents, in effect, a new form of prejudice. [citations 
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omitted]166 
We hear in Larzeg’s complaint, here, something analogous to Okin’s 
complaint about the problems apparent in multiculturalist-liberalism’s 
refusal to interrogate certain “others” (especially those who seem least 
“Westernized”). Like Okin, Larzeg complains about liberals who report only 
selectively on the contexts on which they report (in order, perhaps, to make 
their refraining-from-judgment less apparent and less shocking). The 
consequence of the non-judgmental apologetic method is harmful: 
The hidden premise of the apologetic approach is that the veil is 
unquestionable because its wearers purportedly assume it to be 
so, and as long as they “choose” it, our task as researchers is to 
reveal its benefits for them . . . Furthermore, the academic 
sanctioning of the veil turns it into a fixture of the Muslim 
landscape instead of an evolving phenomenon.167 
She will introduce to discussion of the veil both pointed questions and 
rich account of history, refusing to become disabled by a discovery of 
“agency”: 
As a social scientist, I cannot deny women’s agency or 
substitute mine for theirs on grounds that I am more equipped to 
make sense of their motivations than they are. By the same 
token, mystifying rationalizations are not necessarily 
expressions of false consciousness or [of] “agency.” However, 
agency is not a free-floating capacity independent of the social 
framework within which it expresses itself; neither is it above 
questioning.168 
So, Lazreg reports, her work here will be one of “existential 
philosophy” – an effort that will also involve psychological investigation: 
“[V]eiling involves me as a woman who grew up with relatives, neighbors, 
and friends who wore, or still wear, a veil. Veiling is existentially familiar to 
me; it has been part of my life even though I do not and will not wear a 
veil.”169 
At her point of departure, she notes that: “[I]n the Muslim world as well 
as in the ‘West,’ veiling has come to represent the essence of Islam, [and, 
therefore] little space has been made in which this practice could be 
examined outside the framework of religion, or for its potentially deleterious 
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psychological effects.”170 Her project will include both her persuasive 
arguments that veiling is not religiously-required and that it does indeed 
produce negative psychological – as well as physical – effects. She will 
engage in “rational reflection” with her audience about these matters.171 
Lazreg’s method of “rational reflection” in engagement with religious 
women proves more engaging than that term may seem to promise. It 
includes first-person narrative: some of that involving recollections of her 
childhood in Algeria; some of it reporting her interviews with Muslim 
women concerning their experiences through times of unveiling (1950s and 
1960s) as well as through times of re-veiling (1970s to the present). She 
recollects what she has seen and heard about the physical and psychological 
experiences of being veiled – detailing the deprivations of sensory 
experience and the stunting of psychological development that are produced 
by partial isolation from an outside world of natural phenomena and of other 
human beings. Much of this “thick description” content is powerfully 
affecting. 
Lazreg addresses separately and persuasively the claims that veil-
wearing is a mandated act of modesty; that it protects women against sexual 
harassment; that it expresses “cultural identity;” and, that it is mandated as a 
matter of conviction and piety. Her commentary includes both Quranic 
interpretations and very practical common-sense observations. 
Her concluding chapter/letter – Why Women Should Not Wear the 
Veil172– develops a multi-faceted argument that particularly emphasizes the 
responsibilities that Muslim women have to history and to their co-
religionist women throughout the world at the present moment. She insists 
that young women in Algiers, New York, and Paris who are considering the 
adoption of the veil as a matter of “choice” must become conscious of what 
that move would mean for Muslim women living in areas of the world other 
than their own. “Context is the most important factor that undermines the 
validity as well as the legitimacy of justifications for the veil at the current 
historical conjuncture.”173 
As far as history – Larzeg states: 
. . .I do not think that the women who veil themselves today in 
Algiers, Paris, or New York are engaged in the same struggle as 
Algerian women were in the 1950s, when they freed themselves 
of the veil in order to make history. The war in Iraq bears 
similarities to the Algerian war in military strategy and the logic 
of conquest. It has been a setback for women, whose condition 
                                                          
 170  Id. 
 171  Id. at 12. 
 172  Id. at 97-131. 
 173  Id. at 124. 
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has been aggravated. . . . Similarly, Afghan women had been 
caught in the middle of a long civil war that brought to the fore 
the Taliban, and they continue to be the casualties of ongoing 
battles between US/NATO troops and local warlords. They were 
forced not only to wear the burqa but also to refrain from 
working, among other restrictions. Given these circumstances, it 
is difficult to see how the veil could be perceived as a tool of 
liberation or a symbol of resistance for women who wear it 
outside of these war zones. These women are not taking up the 
veil in solidarity with Iraqi or Afghan women.174 
A woman’s “choice” of the veil, Lazreg urges, 
. . .engages her responsibility toward other women. The fight for 
recognition of the veil as summing up Islam that takes place in 
Paris, New York, or Istanbul necessarily affects the women in 
Rivadh and Tehran who are compelled by law to wear it. As a 
custom grounded in history and sanctified by theologians, the 
veil is never innocent; it is not what it seems to be – a mark of 
religiosity. It is part of a historic power configuration . . . and its 
rehabilitation as a custom reduces women to their biological 
body and denies them autonomy in their body. Cultural 
relativism should not obscure the real effects of veiling on a 
woman’s psyche as she lives out her concrete existence.175 
Lazreg warns young Muslim women to be very wary of the distinctive 
form of “Islamic feminism” currently being advocated by Tariq Ramadan. 
Its advocacy of veiling, she insists, belies its promise.176 “The temptation of 
the veil” being proffered by young Muslim women is – equally – “real” and 
“misleading.”177 
So, Lazreg’s work – while she refuses to engage the ultimate political 
question that we have framed as our focus in this essay – is nonetheless 
richly historical and deeply political. It offers Muslim women an alternative 
to Islamism – an engagement with the present and the future that is deeply 
informed by their history. We appreciate the value of her imagining a space 
of broader freedom for women and we find inspiring her modeling of access 
to an intellectual space outside of cultural relativism. 
At the same time, however, we have characterized Lazreg’s approach as 
somewhat “monocular.” We’ve done this because we are skeptical about her 
attempt to avoid the question of whether liberalist policies should – in some 
                                                          
 174  Id. at 129. 
 175  Id. at 125-26. 
 176  Id. at 115-18. 
 177  Id. at 126. 
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contexts – prohibitively regulate veiling. We believe that the history of 
Islamism of the 20th and 21st centuries – much of which Lazreg herself 
reports – makes that question unavoidable. So, while her powerful writing 
offers clarifications for Muslim women, it does not afford the same 
clarification for the liberalism project in general, precisely because it does 
not engage with the possibility that liberalism, in order to do its proper work, 
may sometimes and in some contexts have to support regulation that looks 
“intolerant.” 
C. Liberal Binocular-ism: Nadia Geerts 
Thus far we have focused on theoretical writing (Scott, Nussbaum, 
Ahmed, and Lazreg) in which the issue of Muslim women’s veiling 
practices has fully occupied the field of inquiry. But, as noted above, 
Muslim women’s re-veilings – and, indeed, the totality of minority-religious 
practices contradictory of women’s equality – are not the only developments 
posing challenges to multiculturalist-liberalism. The expanded power of 
majority-religions in the West, including those (Christian and Jewish) that 
are more mainstream than Islam, poses related challenges. These majority-
religions are also patriarchal, and liberal governments have historically 
colluded with their obstructions of women’s access to quality and to full 
citizenship. Because of both these developments, we note again, the question 
on which we want to focus is therefore the broad one: How should civil 
government treat any culture- or religion-based claim that clashes with the 
norm of gender equality? We have found in recent work of Nadia Geerts an 
approach to this question that is powerful in its rejection of the paralysis of 
multiculturalist-liberalism. Geerts argues strenuously and persuasively that 
women’s equality claims must always prevail over claims that are based on 
culture or religion. She argues that no argument deserves elevated status 
simply because it is attached to religiously- or culturally-based beliefs or 
practices. 
Geerts has devoted two books178 to questions arising at intersections of 
democratic values, secularism, and religious symbols, tackling specifically 
the issue of veiling.179 In both she examines veiling as it has occurred in the 
                                                          
 178  See generally NADIA GEERTS, L’ECOLE A L’EPREUVE DU VOILE (2006) [hereinafter 
GEERTS, L’ECOLE]; NADIA GEERTS, FICHU VOILE!: PETIT ARGUMENTAIRE LAÏQUE, 
FEMINISTE ET ANTIRACISTE (2010) [hereinafter GEERTS, FICHU VOILE !]. 
 179  Geerts articulates her decision to depart from the “foulard” (“scarf”) terminology 
sometimes used in France and Belgium to designate the hijab. GEERTS, FICHU VOILE!, supra 
note 178, at 19.  Explaining her general usage of “voile,” (i.e., “veil”) she emphasizes that she 
sees the range of Muslim head- and body-coverings as “variations of a single phenomenon, the 
sacralization/diabolization of a part of women’s bodies, making that particular part 
‘untouchable’ – or, more precisely, ‘invisible.’ Id. 
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context of recent social and legal developments in Belgium. At the same 
time, she documents trends that have evolved in France since the early 
2000s, and she references developments in Northern Europe and in North 
America, particularly in Quebec, Canada. Geerts’ perspective reminds 
readers of the importance of examining the full range of contexts within 
which events may be situated. The broader view will often disclose linkages 
between local or domestic events and much larger related international 
developments. 
Noting that the political subgroups of society that traditionally 
constitute the Left are deeply divided in the debate on veiling, Geerts 
summarizes the varied and contradictory positions that are advocated in 
Europe by, respectively, feminists, secular people and democrats.180 (And, as 
she states, one single person can indeed embody or support all these 
commitments.) Among feminists, some support the veiling ban at school or 
in institutional settings, while others believe that no emancipation can be 
achieved if it is imposed in a top-down manner or that empowerment of 
women cannot be brought about by “external” actors.181 Among secularists, 
some advocate an approach privileging “inclusive secularism, tolerance, and 
equal respect for all.”182 (Persons in this subgroup tend to find appealing 
Quebec’s model of “reasonable accommodations” of religion.) Other 
secularists insist that there should be no intrusion of the religious into the 
institutional sphere.183 Finally, as Geerts notes, among liberal-democrats, 
there tends to be widespread discomfort with the idea that “in order to 
preserve certain democratic principles, one may need to resort to measures” 
that include banning and prohibiting some practices”184 (an idea seemingly 
in tension with liberalism’s commitment to “tolerance”). 
Throughout FICHU VOILE!, Geerts aims both to debunk prevalent 
misconceptions about the veiling phenomenon and to clarify critical issues. 
For example, while she highlights the fact that veiling is on the rise in 
Belgium (as it is in other nations generally), she rejects easy explanation: 
this “phenomenon cannot be attributed to immigration” in recent years. 
Rather, it must be understood as related to the rise of radical Islam and, 
particularly, to the influence of Saudi Arabia’s funding of local mosques and 
that nation’s support of proselytism among young people.185 
We read Geerts as particularly concerned with five specific and inter-
related developments that are connected to the weakened condition of 
                                                          
 180  Id. at 22-25. 
 181  Id. at 22-23. 
 182  Id. at 23. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. at 24-25.  
 185  Id. at 20. 
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contemporary liberalism: (i) a shift in the discourse of rights which at times 
also informs a shift in legal decisions, and in public opinion; (ii) an elevation 
of the notion of individual freedom to an extent, she argues, that threatens 
the modalities of harmoniously “living together”186 in institutional settings 
(such as schools, state institutions and the political arena specifically); (iii) a 
denial of the political dimension of veiling; (iv) a denial of the gendered 
implications of veiling; and, (v) an increasing, and misplaced, deference to 
any practice or belief presented as religious. She expounds upon each of 
these evolutions. 
A shift in the discourse of rights: First, Geerts identifies and questions a 
major shift that has affected the veil debate in the context of debates about 
“interculturalism” versus “multiculturalism,” currently powerful in Belgium 
and elsewhere.187 She asks specifically: How did the notion of a “right to 
difference” (i.e., a right to be different from the mainstream norm) become 
transformed into the concept of a “difference in rights” (such as is demanded 
by advocates of veiling)?188 As Geerts asserts, the “right to difference” must 
be ensured in all democratic environments since “a truly intercultural society 
should uphold, and be based on, common values that transcend our varied 
particularisms, including religious ones.”189 But the shift in discourse – as 
well as in practice – that trends toward recognition of “difference in rights” 
amounts to a perversion of the foundational “right to difference” that 
democracies should guarantee. 
An elevation of the notion of individual freedom: For Geerts, this shift – 
and the currency it has gained – may well involve several factors, but it can 
be explained in part by the current “sacralization of freedom [which] 
nowadays seems to suspend all judgment [use of reason], as well as to forbid 
any reminder of a norm, or any reference to values of emancipation, freedom 
and progress.”190 (Geerts appears to be alluding here to what is often 
identified as an effect of “anti-foundational” theory in the West.) As she 
                                                          
 186  This expression (loosely translated from “le vivre ensemble”) is used in European 
French-speaking contexts (mainly France and parts of Belgium) to convey the aspiration of 
living together, as diverse communities, in a spirit of harmonious coexistence. See id. at 200-
01. 
 187  Id. at 27. Geerts addresses this debate most specifically at 199-212, making clear her 
rejection of the “idyll of multiculturalism” and her advocacy of an “interculturalism” truly able 
to support “living together.” See id. at 201.  
 188  Id. at 27. For similar comment on this transformation, see Lalia Ducos, Personal Status 
and Bilateral Agreements, WLUML (July 2011), available at 
http://www.wluml.org/resource/dossier-30-31-struggle-secularism-europe-and-north-america 
[hereinafter Ducos] (informing, “Muslim fundamentalism is also growing in France . . . 
Secularist activists see with great disquiet those who accept the existence of differences 
accepting a difference in rights, in the name of respect for difference.” Id. at 89). 
 189  GEERTS, L’ECOLE, supra note 178, at 28. 
 190  Id. at 22. 
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points out, “To go against the grain of this relativism is to systematically 
bring upon oneself suspicion, or even accusations, of racism, intolerance, 
Western-centrism, neo-colonialism, and, of course, of ‘Islamophobia.’”191 
Compounding the effects of a “sacralization of freedom” is an 
additional confusion that is skillfully maintained or manipulated. As 
highlighted in Claude Javeau’s Preface to Geerts’ volume, there exists “a 
confusion, which ought to be emphasized, between a freedom proclaimed at 
an individual level and a freedom to be defended at a collective level.”192 In 
the context of veiling controversies, we would distinguish two types of 
claims. First, the “My veil, my right!” slogans seen in various European pro-
veil street demonstrations and in Islamist pamphlets that seemingly promote 
individual “modesty” or individual “freedom of choice” can be read as 
asserting claims to “individual freedom.” In contrast, a claim based on the 
argument that the veil is the symbol of (a mythical) Muslim identity and that 
criticism of the veil amounts to a denigration of “Muslim values” that is 
harmful to Muslims as a religious or cultural group would be a claim 
asserting “collective freedom.” The two factors – sacralization of freedom 
and confusion over the nature of claims – combine to lead to a specific 
threat: the possibility that “religious propaganda, as it aims to move religion 
out from /the private sphere in order to establish it in the public sphere, 
threatens to fragment the public space into communal ghettos.”193 
A denial of the political dimension of veiling: Geerts notes that many 
commentators fail to recognize that the veil is not a simple “religious 
symbol” but remains – no matter what the intention of the individual 
subject/veil-wearing woman may be – “a flag . . . for an Islamist social 
project” in which “religion comes first and state comes second;” in which 
“women’s bodies are kept under men’s control;” in which “coeducation or 
mingling of the sexes is challenged at school and in society at large; and, in 
which Western democratic values are undermined and attacked.”194 The 
European Court of Human Rights expressed this understanding of the 
meaning of the veil in 2004, in Sahin v. Turkey,195 Geerts notes, when the 
Court stated: “Beyond a simple innocent garment, the ‘scarf’ is becoming 
the symbol of a vision that contradicts women’s freedom and the 
                                                          
 191  GEERTS, L’ECOLE, supra note 178, at 11, 22 (identifying the invention of this term by 
Khomeini “to designate Muslim women who refused to wear the veil”); see also MEREDITH 
TAX, supra note 8. 
 192  GEERTS, L’ECOLE, supra note 178, at 7.  
 193  Id.  
 194  Id. at 27-28. 
 195  Sahin v. Turk., App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004). The judgment was affirmed 
by the Grand Chamber in Sahin. v. Turk., App. No. 4474/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr.  
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fundamental principles of the [Turkish] Republic.”196 But, Geerts points out, 
while there is awareness of the political dimension of veiling in some circles, 
in others, the veil continues to be treated as a banal or an innocuous marker 
adequately characterized as a “scarf” or as a “simple piece of cloth.”197 In 
Belgium, this banalization has led to governmental tolerance of civil service 
employees wearing religious symbols in their workplaces;198 of a college 
professor wearing hijab to teach;199 and of a member of Parliament wearing 
a veil.200 
A denial of the gendered implications of veiling: Geerts observes that 
proponents of veiling often insist on an individual “woman’s right to choose 
[the veil].”201 (This slogan was repeatedly used in demonstrations against the 
banning of the burka in France in 2009 and, prior to that, in 2004-2005 in 
opposition to the law banning all conspicuous religious symbols in French 
state schools.) Crafted by the theoreticians of radical Islam (who usurp the 
mantra of supporters of abortion rights for women), such slogans can 
confound Western liberals who, afraid of being labeled racist, fall into the 
trap of cultural relativism. As Geerts jokes, somewhat bitterly: “Here is a 
true progressive mantra: the argument that one is free to choose one’s 
shackles!”202 
Undoubtedly, some women and teenagers can derive personal benefits 
from being veiled. We are aware that veil-wearing might, for example, 
permit their taking advantage of their status as “virtuous,” “modest,” and 
“pious,” and thereby allow them freedom to engage in activities that would 
not otherwise be possible for them – e.g., pursuing studies; displaying deep 
                                                          
 196  This understanding has also been expressed by numerous human rights advocates and 
feminists. See Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of 
Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International Law, 45 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367 (2007) [hereinafter Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights]. 
See generally GEERTS, L’ECOLE, supra note 178, at 33-34; Ducos, supra note 188. At the 
same time, it is effectively denied by certain human rights groups, prompting feminists such as 
Nadia Geerts to argue in response. See Nadia Geerts, Lettre ouverte à Amnesty International 
(Apr. 25, 2012), http://nadiageerts.over-blog.com/article-lettre-ouverte-a-amnesty-
internationa-104056238.html [hereinafter Geerts, Lettre ouverte].  
 197  Geerts, Lettre ouverte, supra note 196, at 21. 
 198  Geerts references the policy recommended by the Diversity Office of the Ministry of 
Justice, recommending that religious symbols be allowed for government workers. Id.  
 199  Geerts provides an account of a case involving a veil-wearing mathematics teacher, 
and argues that teachers’ veil-wearing – even in the absence of their actively proselytizing – 
violates the “neutrality” essential to the teacher-student relationship. Id. at 158-62.  
 200  Geerts criticizes sharply the veil-wearing of Mahinur Ozdemir, elected to Parliament in 
2009, characterizing it as marking her religious identity in a singular way and as confusing 
elected officials’ – or candidates’ – political projects with their religious or philosophical 
beliefs. Id. at 168. 
 201  Id. at 112. 
 202  Id.  
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cleavage; or, sneaking out to meet lesbian lovers. Undoubtedly, too, many 
veiled women are strong and empowered, and able to challenge the often 
racist environments in which they live. Still, the veil remains, as Chahdortt 
Djavann has stated powerfully, the “yellow star of women’s status.”203 
Geerts notes that advocates of veiling often accuse their opponents of 
being Western imperialists who systematically undermine women’s agency 
and construct all “Muslim women” as inherently victimized. Deconstructing 
that proposition, she urges that veiled girls and veiled women are indeed 
victims of a pervasive form of imperialism – but not of the Western type, as 
generally alleged: rather, they are “victims of Saudi imperialism.”204 Indeed, 
the veil may be a cultural marker – but, as such, it has nothing to do with the 
traditions from which the families of most veiled women and teenagers in 
Belgium originate: the plain, dark or white, veils prevalent in Belgium could 
not be farther away from Turkish or Moroccan traditional forms of 
veiling.205 
Further, Geerts proposes, veiled women and girls are constructed as 
“victims-only” by advocates of the veil, as much as they are so-constructed 
by Westerners displaying deep-seated “post-colonial arrogance.”206 Veiled 
women may be constructed by Islamists either as victims of Western-
colonialism or as victims of “Islamophobia.” These Islamists purport that 
“veiling is a fundamental right that cannot be restricted”207 and that “only 
hostility . . . could explain an opposition to veiling.”208 Geerts to the 
contrary, marshals evidence establishing that much of the opposition to 
veiling, especially in schools, is not an expression of “racism nor a sign of 
hostility to diversity.”209 She also notes that “the parents of most Muslim 
girls are not themselves opposed to banning the veil at school.”210 
In fact, Geerts points out that “. . .more than a religious sign, the veil is 
                                                          
 203  Id. at 187, n.9 (quoting Chahdorrt Djavann’s formulation “l’étoile jaune de la condition 
féminine.” CHAHDORTT DJAVANN, BAS LES VOILES! (2003)). 
 204  Id. at 47-48.  
 205  This point resonates with the “invention of tradition” we have identified supra. See 
Leila Ahmed’s reference to Egyptian Islamists’ fashioning (from the 1970s onward) a new 
dress code for women which they define as being “traditional” though it has little to do with 
indigenous forms of veiling. As Ahmed notes, this form of hijab prescribed by this dress code 
– was in its origins different from traditional types and was, instead, a garment “worn by 
women of the Muslim Brotherhood—and only by the women of the Muslim Brotherhood.” 
AHMED, supra note 94, at 3; Geerts, Lettre ouverte, supra note 196, at 32, 46-47; see also 
Anissa Hélie, supra note 115 (referencing footnotes 97-99 and accompanying text). 
 206  Geerts, Lettre ouverte, supra note 196, at 58. 
 207  Id. at 11. 
 208  Id.  
 209  Id. at 65. 
 210  Id. at 66. 
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a gendered sign,”211 evidenced by the fact that the alleged requirement-of-
veiling does not apply to men. Further, the veil is the sign of a “morally 
inacceptable sexual morality”212 and its primary goal is to mark women as 
sexually unavailable objects of male lust and “urges.” This sexual marking 
applies not only to women, but even to young girls. To illustrate this, Geerts 
refers to a court case involving the parents of two female pupils, aged nine to 
ten years-old, who had been veiled since their first year of primary school 
(i.e., since ages five or six). She is indignant at the implicit suggestion that 
the bodies of such young girls should be marked as “sexually 
unavailable.”213 And she rejects equally strongly policies providing that 
children and teenagers can attend schools while veiled. Geerts sees these as 
indefensible exceptions to the recognitions and protections of young 
persons, (because of their immaturity), that are otherwise broadly evident in 
general regulations – e.g., in prohibitions of minors’ smoking, consuming 
alcohol, engaging in (even consensual) sexual behavior, or voting.214 
Because sexism is much more explicit now than it was a decade ago, 
Geerts insists, it is urgent to assert that: 
[W]e cannot tolerate . . . in the name of respect for difference, 
the further spread of the idea that a respectable woman is a 
veiled woman; that a veiled woman must lower her gaze in front 
of a man; that she must refuse all contact with any man who 
isn’t related to her; and that her body must be entirely veiled.215 
An increasing and misplaced deference to any practice or belief 
presented as religious: Geerts explains her position about the proper 
relationship of church and state. She specifies: “The simple fact that any 
behavior may be motivated by a strict observance of religious principles 
does not in any way constitute an argument in its favor.”216 Religious-
motivation is simply not a relevant criterion. With regard to veiling 
specifically, “civil society. . .must determine whether veiling is compatible 
with the rules of ‘living together:’ this is the relevant question.”217 Further 
applying this principle to the veiling issue, Geerts observes that an 
individual’s veil-wearing may be problematic as disrupting of the modalities 
of “living together”: by her wearing a veil, she “defines herself first and 
foremost as a good Muslim, respectful of religious dogmas (or as a sexual 
                                                          
 211  Id. at 35. 
 212  Id. at 43. 
 213  Id. at 36-38, 56. 
 214  Id. at 113. 
 215  Id. at 68. 
 216  Id. at 71. 
 217  Id. at 13. 
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being), rather than as a pupil open to learning,” or as a public servant, or an 
elected political figure primarily doing her job.218 
All these considerations together lead Geerts to conclude that it is 
crucial to maintain a strict separation between church and state – a notion, 
she stresses, that is often misunderstood. Secular people should not be 
“perceived to be anti-religious;” they are simply “firmly opposed to any 
interference of the religious in the political sphere.”219 In actual fact, 
“secularism is nothing else than a political organizational principle which 
posits the necessary reciprocal independence of church and state, so that no 
religion – including irreligion – is able to, precisely, establish itself as state 
religion, which would threaten the freedom of conscience that every 
democratic state must preserve.”220 
Given the rise of the Muslim religious right and of other religions’ 
influence in Western democracies and in international fora, we find 
ourselves at a crossroad. Geerts warns us: 
We are now confronted with a choice; we must today make a 
choice, and one which is urgent, between affirming the primacy 
of gender equality and the primacy that some would gladly give 
to religious freedom. And we are required to make this choice 
“in a climate that tends to construct the constitutional principle 
of gender equality as a second-class principle, as a principle that 
is contingent and subjected to the priorities set by other 
principles. Including, in this case, the principle of religious 
freedom.221 
In making these recommendations, Geerts demonstrates her perfect 
understanding of the pitfalls of multiculturalism and her determination to 
escape these. Geerts urges her readers to uphold firmly liberalism’s 
commitment to protecting both democratic principles and women’s equality. 
At the same time, she warns us that the banning of veil-wearing in schools 
(by pupils, teachers, and staff), as well as bans applicable to civil servants 
and political figures, must be accompanied by positive measures222 that will 
truly offer equal opportunities to young girls of all social and ethnic 
backgrounds. 
                                                          
 218  Id. at 21. Geerts references the policy recommended by the Diversity Office of the 
Ministry of Justice, recommending that religious symbols be allowed for government workers. 
Id. at 21. Geerts provides an account of a case involving a veil-wearing mathematics teacher, 
and argues that teachers’ veil-wearing – even in the absence of their actively proselytizing – 
violates the “neutrality” essential to the teacher-student relationship. Id. at 158-62.  
 219  Id. at 82. 
 220  Id. at 83. 
 221  Id. at 68 (quoting ANNE MARIE LIZIN, AU-DELA DU VOILE 24-25 (2004)). 
 222  Id. at 58. 
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Of the writers whose work we have reviewed here, Geerts is singular in 
having responded unequivocally to the question of the conflict between 
“women’s equality” and “religious liberty.” She affirms unconditionally: 
the hierarchization of human rights appears inevitable if one 
wants to be in a position to settle the conflicts that necessarily 
arise between some of these rights. The European Court of 
Human Rights understood this when [in the 2004 case Sahin v. 
Turkey] it affirmed that equality between men and women and 
laïcité [secularism] were principles superior to the right to 
express one’s religious beliefs.223 
III. LIBERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: FEMINIST, ANTI-RACIST, AND 
SECULARIST224 
In 1999, identifying Will Kymlicka as “the foremost contemporary 
defender of cultural group rights” and assessing his work as representative of 
that of all prominent defenders of multiculturalism, Susan Okin pointed out 
that, in spite of enormous evidence of “cultural practices that control and 
subordinate women,” Kymlicka’s work had not “adequately or even directly 
addressed the troubling connections between gender and culture or the 
conflicts that arise so commonly between feminism and multiculturalism.”225 
While writing of culture, Okin understood religion to be an aspect of culture. 
She emphasized: “Those who make liberal arguments for the rights of 
groups. . .must take special care to look at inequalities within those groups. 
It is especially important to consider inequalities between the sexes, since 
they are likely to be less public, and thus less easily discernible.”226 
 The problem identified by Okin in 1999 has become more visible in 
ensuing years. In Uneasy Partners,227 contributing his thoughts about 
multiculturalism in Canada – and doing so as one of six male essayists 
responding to the essay by the single woman among the contributors – Will 
Kymlicka has now acknowledged that: “[I]t may well be true that in some 
cases the ethos of multiculturalism in Canada has served to suppress debates 
about how best to achieve. . .emancipatory aims . . . .”228 
                                                          
 223  Id. at 98.  
 224  The caption of this section echoes one of the subtitles in GEERTS, FICHU VOILE!, supra 
note 178. 
 225  Okin, supra note 1, at 20; see WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND 
CULTURE (1st ed. 1989); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL 
THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995). 
 226  Okin, supra note 1, at 23. 
 227  UNEASY PARTNERS: MULTICULTURALISM AND RIGHTS IN CANADA (Janice Gross 
Stein et al. eds., 2007). 
 228  These acknowledgments are welcome, because for too long Kymlicka has been 
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We understand the “ethos of multiculturalism” to designate liberalism’s 
misguided turn away from its historical commitments to liberty and equality 
of individuals, a turn made in order to provide stronger protection of groups. 
We have focused here on the way that that turn has exacerbated liberalism’s 
practical failure to deliver equality to women. But the turn toward 
multiculturalism has meant that liberalism has been weakened in theory as 
well as in practice. We have seen that reality in our examination of the 
controversies about veilings, in which many liberals (including some human 
rights organizations) have been so distracted by real or imagined injuries to 
groups that they have failed to recognize and to intervene against those 
groups’ own egregious harms to individual women. We think we have seen 
it, too, in American legal-theoretical writing about “the veil,” including, 
perhaps most prominently, writings of Leti Volpp229 and of Adrien 
Katherine Wing and Monica Nigh Smith.230 Our own analysis of “the veil” 
will differ from the perspectives of this work in its insistence that a renewed 
liberalism must be unqualifiedly feminist as well as anti-racist. We further 
insist that a renewed liberalism – in order to be committedly feminist and 
anti-racist – must also be committed to secularism. 
We approach our analysis with a focus, first, on “the veil,” offering 
argument in support of the French law of 2004 banning all conspicuous 
religious symbols from school grounds. Secondly, we argue – more broadly 
– in favor of liberalism’s commitment to preserving and enriching cultures 
of secularism. We do this not out of any hostility toward religion but 
because of our recognition that the preservation of “secular space” is 
essential: (a) for liberalism’s breaking away from collusion with patriarchal 
religious forces – both mainstream and minority – that are hostile to 
women’s equality; and, (b) for reducing political conflicts strongly attached 
to religious identities. We will stress what we think are four key 
considerations. 
(1) Preliminarily, we want to acknowledge our recognition that right-
wing groups will misinterpret and misuse veil controversies. In Western 
contexts marked by openly racist discourses and assaults on ethnic and 
religious minorities, vocal demands in favor of veiling can strengthen 
negative stereotypes about “Muslims” and can be used to justify the 
                                                          
satisfied with the proposition that the “gravitational pull” of democracy will draw into the 
ambit of democratic values the beliefs of conservative ethnic and religious groups. It is very 
much to the credit of his interlocutor, Janice Gross Stein, that she has provoked them by her 
critique of Canadian multiculturalism in operation. Will Kymlicka, Disentangling the Debate, 
in UNEASY PARTNERS: MULTICULTURALISM AND RIGHTS IN CANADA 147, 147 (Janice Gross 
Stein et al. eds., 2007). 
 229  See Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571 (2007). 
 230  See Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the 
Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743 (2006). 
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narrative that “Muslims” may be in need of Western disciplining and 
wisdom. That secularists are anxious to cater to ultra-conservatives 
(including Le Pen in France, and Romney in the United States) remains a 
real issue.231 This issue is clearly of great concern to Leila Ahmed, who 
observes: 
I continue to believe. . .that the rights and conditions of women 
in Muslim-majority societies often are acutely in need of 
improvement, as indeed they are in many other societies. But the 
question now is how we address such issues while not allowing 
our work and concerns to aid and abet imperialist projects, 
including war projects that mete out death and trauma to Muslim 
women under the guise and to the accompaniment of a rhetoric 
of saving them.232 
With this issue very much alive, liberals should indeed be concerned 
not to feed racist and gendered stereotyping, and concerned, as well, not to 
support neo-conservative projects that, while asserting Western superiority, 
predict an increase in conflicts linked to “competing cultural identities.”233 
At the same time, liberals must remember that ultra-conservative/racist 
discourses will not be successfully undermined or defeated by liberals’ 
catering to the Muslim religious right. Or by liberals’ catering to any 
religious institutions, whose mainstream incarnations – conceptualized and 
run by men – are by definition patriarchal. The fact that Western 
conservatives and extreme right-wing constituencies use the veil debate as 
political fodder must not lead liberals to forget two significant facts. First, as 
Leila Ahmed has demonstrated in her examinations of both the Egyptian and 
the U.S. contexts (and as has been attested in other regions234), the 
                                                          
 231  How can one not worry when a U.S. presidential candidate in 2012 can openly assert 
the superiority of U.S./Western “culture” over that of Palestinians (read: Muslims)? 
See Ashley Parker & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Romney Trip Raises Sparks at a 2nd Stop, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/us/politics/romney-angers-palestinians-with-comments-
in-israel.html. 
 232  AHMED, supra note 94, at 229. 
 233  The text probably most cited – or mis-cited – in support of those projects is: Samuel 
Huntington, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD 
ORDER (1996). For a perspective challenging Huntington’s construction of “cultural 
identity,” see interview by Mark O’Keefe with Akbar Ahmed, Pew Forum: Five Years After 
9/11, “Dialogue” with Islam Cause for Hope, Aug. 22, 2006, available at: 
http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Five-Years-After-911-Dialogue-with-Islam-
Cause-for-Hope.aspx. 
 234  See, e.g., AYESHA IMAM, JENNY MORGAN & NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, WARNING SIGNS 
OF FUNDAMENTALISMS (2004), available at 
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/WLUML-WSF-1h-final.pdf. 
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proliferation of Islamist dress codes does not reflect the real political 
perspectives of the majority of Muslim believers and persons of Muslim 
heritage. Second, discrimination, including the subordination of women in 
the name of freedom of religion, must be challenged. 
(2) Next, in specific support of our argument in support of the French 
prohibition of “all conspicuous religious symbols” in public schools, we 
urge recognition of both the political effect of veiling and the violence 
associated with enforcement of veiling mandates (whether those are enforced 
by governmental or non-state actors)—both of these realities having 
egregious consequences for women’s equality. 
While acknowledging the varied meanings that have attached to “the 
veil” in different times and places – we read as incontrovertible the message 
strongly communicated by Bennoune, Lazreg, and Geerts: that the veil is – 
necessarily and inevitably at the present moment—a political and politicized 
symbol throughout the world. It cannot be overlooked that veiling is used 
primarily (though not only, of course) by the Muslim religious right, as a 
tool to enforce strict gender norms. It is also used by young Muslims who 
originate from or now live in Western contexts, as a marker of identity that 
references culture and religion. It is sometimes used by Western liberals to 
mark their associations with particular claims of culture-based rights. And, 
at the same time, it is denigrated by the Western right-wing in “a repeated 
pattern played out many times in history when women, Islam, and the veil 
merged into the foreground as symbols of civilizational tensions.”235 As 
Lazreg has observed, it cannot be an “innocent” symbol.236 Instead it is 
necessarily a marker of women’s sexual difference, emphasizing their 
consignment to specific roles and social locations. 
We urge liberals’ recognition that the veil is and has for decades been a 
political tool of radical Islamists. Marnia Lazreg has described the history of 
extremist Muslim fundamentalist groups that have acted both vigorously and 
persistently for decades – and in multiple areas of the world – to ensure that 
the “veil comes to represent the essence of Islam.”237 Focusing on 20th-
century history in Egypt and on developments in the United States since the 
late 1960s, Leila Ahmed has documented the promotion of the veil by 
extremist religio-political forces to assure its having this singular 
significance. 
Ahmed has examined what we think of as an “invention of tradition” 
that has been key to this promotion, an invention that has depended upon 
denials of historical realities.238 The fact that the veil is often 
                                                          
 235  AHMED, supra note 94, at 195. 
 236  LAZREG, supra note 162, at 125.  
 237  Id. at 10.  
 238  The historical realities denied have included: the variations in veiling practices that 
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(mis)understood, echoing the Islamist mantra, as simply involving “piety, 
self-respect and free choice”239 is one demonstration of Islamists’ successful 
inroads into public and academic discourses. 
We want to emphasize, also, the mechanisms through which the 
practice of veiling has been effectively coerced. Some forms of coercion 
have been exercised through pressures toward social conformity that are 
exerted by peers, preached through religious propaganda, or urged through 
anti-imperialist discourse. When peer pressure has been used, it has been 
used systematically, as Ahmed has recorded.240 The efficacy of religious 
propaganda is evident, worldwide, in the degree to which the global trend 
toward veiling is often mistakenly understood as the expression of a 
religious obligation. Many believe that “this is what Muslims do: women are 
veiled.” But there is of course plenty of internal debate, including debate 
among religious scholars, as to whether veiling is a religious requirement 
(God’s injunction) or a man-made diktat. Lazreg is one scholar who has 
argued strenuously that: “Nowhere in the Quran is there an indication that 
the veil is an indication of a woman’s acceptance of her faith.”241 Lazreg has 
commented, too, on the ways in which anti-Western-imperialist discourse 
has operated in academic research of the last decades.242 
An additional coercive force, often overlooked in discussions of 
increased veiling, has been the critical significance of the Gulf States’ 
imperialism. An absolutely crucial reality has been the powerful flow of 
Saudi and Kuwaiti money into Western Muslim communities. As noted by 
Geerts, Saudi funding in Belgium has enabled activity ranging from pro-
veiling pamphleteering to the building of mosques.243 Ahmed, too, has 
documented the links between Saudi money and the development, in the 
United States, of the Muslim Student Association and ISNA – projects 
whose developments have been highly instrumental in leading young women 
to take up veiling practices.244 
It has been reported of Saudi Arabia that: “There is no other state who 
                                                          
have occurred even during the 20th century, the periods during which veil-wearing has been 
seen as a reflection of habit or place of origin or class, rather than of religion or “Islamist 
identity,” and the periods during which absolutely no connection was recognized between a 
woman’s veiling or non-veiling practice and her individual identity as a religious or non-
religious Muslim. AHMED, supra note 94, at 27 (referencing footnote 114 and accompanying 
text). 
 239  GEERTS, FICHU VOILE!, supra note 178, at 182-83. 
 240  AHMED, supra note 94, at 25-26 (referencing footnotes 104-108 and accompanying 
text).  
 241  LAZREG, supra note 162, at 77. 
 242  Id. at 6. 
 243  GEERTS, FICHU VOILE!, supra note 178, at 48. 
 244  AHMED, supra note 94, at 155-56, 160-63, 169, 187-89.  
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spends as much money at ensuring conservatism and fanaticism among 
Muslims.”245 A 2007 report on Saudi financing states: 
Saudi Arabia’s brand of Islam, the ultra-conservative 
Wahhabism, has been exported globally and is followed by al-
Qa’ida and other Sunni fundamentalist groups responsible for 
terrorist attacks around the world. Funding for such groups 
comes from charitable organisations and wealthy individuals in 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.. . . In the decade up to 2002, 
according to a report to the UN Security Council, al-Qa’ida and 
other Islamist bodies collected between £150m and £250m, 
mostly from Saudi charities and private donors. This practice is 
still occurring, with Saudi Arabia linked to funding Sunni 
jihadists in Iraq.246 
In the Summer 2012 Olympic Games in London, a new example of what 
Saudi money can buy became evident when athletes participated in hijab for 
the first time, flouting the rules of the Olympic Charter.247 
Demands for veiling are specifically articulated and promoted by 
fundamentalist forces. Despite their differences (across and within religious 
traditions) fundamentalists’ ideological goal for society is one that is 
detrimental to the human rights of women, of secular voices, of religious 
minorities, of stigmatized sexualities, etc. As feminist scholars have noted, 
in all cultures, women are the pivotal territories, markers, and reproducers of 
the narratives of nations and other collectivities.248 The Women Living 
Under Muslim Laws Network has also noted, based on its three decades of 
documenting and analyzing the strategies used by politico-religious forces, 
that the control of women, and the control of their sexuality in particular, 
constitute the cornerstone of a fundamentalist agenda. With the rise of 
fundamentalist politics, discourses of moral codes and arguments of cultural 
and religious “authenticity” are increasingly being deployed as means of 
control. Further, women (along with others deemed “undesirable” or 
“deviant”) are specifically targeted by politico-religious groups. 
                                                          
 245  Saudi Time Bomb?: Interview Vali Nasr, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/interviews/nasr.html (last visited Nov. 
24, 2012). 
 246  Paul Cochrane, Terror Finance Trail Vanishes in Saudi Arabia, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 
30, 2007), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/terror-finance-trail-vanishes-in-
saudi-arabia-403912.html. 
 247  For a history of this dispute and discussion of the Olympic Charter specification that 
“no kind of demonstration of political, religious, or racial propaganda is permitted on any 
Olympic sites, venues or other areas,” see Julie Bindel, On Track: The Great Olympic Cover-
Up, STANDPOINT MAGAZINE (June 2011), available at 
http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/3930/full. 
 248  NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, GENDER AND NATION 39 (1997). 
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Even if it is often forgotten in both the Western media249 and Western 
conservative discourses, it is a fact that religious fundamentalism is a global 
phenomenon that affects all major religions,250 and that religious 
fundamentalisms feed one another.251 
                                                          
 249  EDWARD SAID, COVERING ISLAM: HOW THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETERMINE 
HOW WE SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD (1997). 
 250  It should be remembered, for example, that Orthodox Jews have instituted sex-
segregated public transportation in some neighborhoods in New York City on buses that are 
New York City-subsidized, although operated by private transport companies (which benefit 
from the public funding). See Sasha Chavkin & Josh Nathan-Kazis, Riding Together on Sex-
Segregated Buses, ISRAEL RELIGIOUS ACTION CENTER (Nov. 5, 2011), 
http://www.irac.org/NewsDetailes.aspx?ID=1278. Further, shopkeepers in Hasidic 
neighborhoods in Brooklyn, New York, are under pressure from local “modesty committees” 
who appear “concerned that the mannequins in [their] stores’ window, used to display 
women’s clothing, might inadvertently arouse passing men and boys.” The verbal warnings 
issued by such “modesty committees” in Williamsburg carry “an implied threat — comply 
with community standards or be shunned. It is a potent threat in a neighborhood where 
shadowy, sometimes self-appointed modesty squads use social and economic leverage to 
enforce conformity.” As a result, faceless heads models have recently replaced mannequins, 
while groups of men also “seek to pressure parents to rein in children who wear dresses too 
short or stockings too thin.” See Joseph Berger, Modesty in Ultra-Orthodox Brooklyn is 
Enforced by Secret Squads, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/nyregion/shadowy-squads-enforce-modesty-in-hasidic-
brooklyn.html?pagewanted=1. Their counterparts in the city of Beit Shemesh, Israel, in order 
to excuse discrimination and violence perpetrated against an eight-year-old girl who allegedly 
had not observed the proper dress code, insisted that “spitting on a girl who isn’t behaving 
according to the law of the Torah is justified.” See Allison Kaplan Sommer, The 8-year-Old 
Girl Who Woke Up Israel, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (Dec. 25, 2011), 
http://blogs.forward.com/sisterhood-blog/148571/. It should also be remembered that in 2012 a 
prominent Coptic Bishop insisted that Egyptian Christian women should dress “more 
modestly” and imitate their “Muslim sisters.” See Mariz Tadros, Egypt's Women Have Had 
Enough of Being Told to Cover Up, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/29/egypt-women-cover-up-
coptic?INTCMP=SRCH. And it should be remembered that Christian fundamentalists are 
denouncing the “gay peril” from their pulpits in Jamaica and elsewhere in the Caribbean. See 
Can counselling ‘fix’ my gay husband?, Jamaica Observer (Apr. 23, 2012),  
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/magazines/allwoman/Can-counselling--fix--my-gay-
husband_11270719; Marc Lacey, Anti-gay violence defies laid-back image of Jamaica, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/world/americas/24iht-
jamaica.1.10331900.html?pagewanted=all; Adele Ramos, Belize Churches Join GOB in Court 
Battle Against Homosexuals, AMANDALA (May 22, 2011),  
http://amandala.com.bz/news/belize-churches-join-gob-in-court-battle-against-homosexuals/. 
Additionally, these groups are lobbying aggressively in Uganda to add draconian provisions to 
the existing criminalization of consensual sex-same conduct. See Tim Padgett, Viewpoint: 
Uganda’s Anti-Gay Bill a Christmas Alarm for Christians, TIME (Dec. 4, 2012),  
http://world.time.com/2012/12/04/viewpoint-ugandas-anti-gay-bill-a-christmas-alarm-for-
christians/.  
 251  The Uganda “anti-homosexuality” matter (among other examples of coalition-building 
across religions) involves collaborations between local and U.S. Christian Evangelists. See 
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We want to emphasize, as well, in considering the French Law of 2004, 
that the recent history of enforcement of veiling has been a history of 
violence. As we have documented in Section I.A, forces of violence and 
threats of violence have been deployed against women when and where 
other forms of coercion have been ineffective in assuring their veiling. That 
history of violence leads us to emphasize the urgency that Western liberals – 
and especially young persons, Muslims and non-Muslims, living in Western 
democracies – learn about the realities of enforcements. It is critical that the 
history of violent enforcement of veiling mandates not be forgotten, and that 
the Algerian history of the 1990s be particularly referenced as illustrative of 
that phenomenon.252 
Murders of women by Islamist armed factions became commonplace in 
Algeria throughout the 1990s. Initially, specific groups of women (such as 
“unveiled women, hairdressers, working women or single women . . .who 
did not follow [radical Islamists’] diktats”253) were more at risk. 
Fundamentalists also sought to prove their effectiveness at eliminating 
“undesirable” members of the community (e.g., women engaged in 
prostitution, and lesbian or transsexual women). Later, women who had 
chosen non-traditional careers (e.g., doctors, journalists, school 
headmistresses, architects, and athletes), as well as feminist activists,254 were 
systematically targeted. Women dressed in European clothes were scarred, 
disfigured, or attacked with acid.255 
In all cases, perpetrators were clearly linked to extreme-right Islamist 
groups. Armed groups such as the GIA (Islamic Armed Group) took 
responsibility for such crimes, claiming to execute God’s law. For example, 
El Moundhir, a GIA leader, announced in 1997 (in the London-based 
underground newspaper Al Djamaa) that the GIA had a “duty” to “eliminate 
immodest or debauched women [and] those who use alcohol or drugs, and 
those who do not pray.” Abou El Moundhir added, “Our fighters only kill 
                                                          
Kapya John Kaoma, Colonizing African Values: How the U.S. Christian Right is Transforming 
Sexual Politics in Africa (2012), available at 
http://www.publiceye.org/Reports/Colonizing_African_Values/Pdfs/PRA%20Report%2072dp
i.pdf; see also LGBT Uganda Fights Back: The Case Against Scott Lively, CENTER FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/LGBTUganda/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2012) 
(discussing information on the federal law suit launched in March 2012 by the Center for 
Constitutional Rights). 
 252  LAZREG, supra note 162, at 122. 
 253  See INT’L WOMEN’S HUM. RTS. LAW CLINIC & WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM 
LAWS, SHADOW REPORT ON ALGERIA 9 (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter SHADOW REPORT ON 
ALGERIA], available at 
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/import/english/pubs/pdf/misc/shadow-report-
algeria-eng.pdf.  
 254  Id. at 9, 14. 
 255  Id. at 12.  
HELIE AND ASHE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2013 3:41 PM 
60 University of California, Davis [Vol. 19.1 
those who deserve to die.” 256 Even if social-political contexts may vary and 
if the place accorded to women may be adjusted to local contingencies, the 
goal of fundamentalists – to impose a type of gender apartheid within a 
theocratic system – does not vary. Hence, this history must not be 
forgotten.257 
(3) We want to emphasize, most strenuously, our conviction that that 
liberalism has in recent years been de-railed by a failure to see beyond 
recognition of racism. We have already suggested, in our discussion of Joan 
Scott’s work, that she has been blinded by a fixed-focus on the history of 
French racism. That focus – through which she has seen Islamist radicals 
only as victims of racism – has made her unable to recognize the human 
rights violations perpetrated through Islamist programs aimed at propagating 
veiling practices. What we have characterized as a blindness in Scott is by 
no means unique to her.258 We have come to believe that the task of 
“challenging The Empire” often renders liberals myopic.259 Liberals have 
some experience in looking for, and recognizing racism. It may be that 
racism is almost always at the top of their lists of human rights violations to 
watch out for. (It is our opinion that women’s rights are nowhere near the 
top of liberals’ lists.) In any case, a discovery of racism should never be the 
ending-point of liberals’ inquiries. 
                                                          
 256  AFP, Those Who Deserve to Die, 
http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/3gia.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).  
 257  In memory of the women who resisted fundamentalists’ pressure in Algeria, especially 
during the 1990s, RAFD (Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Démocrates) activists created 
the “Award for Women’s Resistance Against Fundamentalism and Against Forgetting” (Prix 
de la résistance des femmes contre l'intégrisme et contre l'oubli). In 2001, this prize was 
awarded posthumously to eleven women teachers assassinated in 1997, a time when schooling 
of girls was banned by Islamists. It has also been awarded posthumously in 1999 to Katia 
Bengana, a 17-year-old Algerian girl who in 1994, because of her refusal to wear the hijab, 
was assassinated by Islamic extremists as she made her way home from school. For a historical 
summary see Lalia Ducos, Algérie: Le code de la famille - les femmes contre l’intégrisme, 
SECULARISM IS A WOMEN’S ISSUE (Feb. 28, 2010),  http://www.siawi.org/article1702.html. 
Concerning the case of Katia Benganas, a 1995 Amnesty International appeal related to death 
threats issued (and murders perpetrated) by Islamist armed groups against Algerian women 
who did not comply with the imposed dress code, see Algeria Appeal Case: Algeria, 
AMNESTY,  http://www.amnesty.org/pt-br/library/asset/ACT77/004/1995/en/4ee796e7-eb64-
11dd-b8d6-03683db9c805/act770041995en.pdf. 
 258  See Wing & Smith, supra note 230. See generally Volpp, supra note 229. 
 259  See Bennoune, Law of the Republic, supra note 86, at 181 (noting that “both Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, along with a number of other international human 
rights groups, like the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), have been 
outspokenly critical of the French Law [of 2004] . . . Moreover, some prominent international 
human rights lawyers have been involved in recent cases defending the ‘right to veil’ at school 
. . . .”); id. at 189 (characterizing: “the failure of human rights forces to comprehend and 
respond forcefully to the menace of religious fundamentalisms – in this particular 
manifestation, to Muslim fundamentalist pressure on women and girls to cover . . . ”).  
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Western liberals must be mindful of the cleverness of the pro-veil 
arguments advanced by fundamentalist Islamists/politico-religious forces. 
These arguments are clever enough to persuade teenagers interested in 
embracing a “true Muslim identity” and/or standing up to Western arrogance 
and racism. They are clever enough to attract citizens of Muslim heritage, 
who feel they can use the hijab to assert: “I’m a Muslim – Deal with it!” 
And they are clever enough to distract liberals who – inclined to agonize, 
“Who am I to dictate my values to the Other?” – would rather play blind 
than run the risk of being accused of racism. Human rights lawyer and 
feminist advocate Rhonda Copelon (who was the lead attorney in a case 
involving a leader of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) accused of 
crimes against humanity, arguing against his being granted asylum in the 
United States) found the liberal “reluctance to really take on the political 
manipulation of religion, which becomes a reluctance to take on people who 
act in the name of God” to be especially strong when “you are dealing with . 
. . an immigrant minoritised population. . . .  
You are talking about a really excluded group [Muslims in a racist 
context] and that plays differently in terms of the willingness to critique.”260 
It is indeed the moral obligation of liberals to name racism wherever we 
discern it, and to work to challenge and to undo its deep and persisting 
effects. Most important in liberal efforts must be an insistence on the 
implementation of positive measures to overcome and remediate the harms 
produced by discriminations on the basis of race.261 But it is also important 
to be alert to alarming warning signs,262 and to the fact that, as Algerian 
feminist Lalia Ducos (witness to the rise of fundamentalist terror in her 
home country in the 1980s and 1990s), warns: “[F]undamentalism’s new 
strategy is to give visibility to ‘religious communities’ and their claims.”263 
It is important to be particularly alert to those arguments used by Islamists – 
crafted to appeal to liberal sensibilities – that are framed in terms of respect 
for culture and diversity. 
                                                          
 260  WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS, DOSSIER 30-31: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
SECULARISM IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 254-55 (2011), available at 
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/WLUML%20dossier%2030-31%20v2.pdf.  
 261  The need for such positive measures in France has been stressed particularly by Scott, 
Geerts, and Bennoune in their discussions of the situations of the banlieues. In the United 
States, the continued reality of racism is evidenced by the extremely disproportionate 
incarceration of African-American and Hispanic citizens. See generally MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
(2010). 
 262  For a global overview of such trends, see Imam, Morgan & Yuval-Davis, supra note 
234. For warning signs in Western liberal democracies specifically, see generally DOSSIER 30-
31: THE STRUGGLE FOR SECULARISM IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, supra note 260. 
 263  Ducos, supra note 188, at 89.  
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It is important, moreover, that liberals avoid “new form[s] of 
prejudice”264 based on stereotypings that are akin to racism. Lazreg has 
identified this kind of stereotyping in academic research that celebrates the 
“agency” of veil-wearing women while dismissing non-veil wearing women 
as “un-authentic.”265 Bennoune, countering such stereotyping trends, has 
reported perspectives that have not received much attention in Europe or, 
especially, in North America: the voices of democrats and feminists from 
Muslim communities. These include the views of people of Muslim heritage 
who are keenly aware of the danger posed by both Muslim and other 
religious fundamentalisms. Bennoune reports, for example, that “[Jeanne] 
Favret-Saada identifies some Muslim fundamentalist groups as important 
allies of the Catholic Church in its opposition to women’s rights and 
homosexuality.”266 She herself observes that: “This Catholic Church project 
is often clearly opposed by those same Western leftwing, liberal and human 
right figures”267 who place religious freedom over gender equality. She 
identifies, too, Mohamed Sifaoui’s emphasis that “the Muslim 
fundamentalists are our extreme right.”268 Bennoune insists – as do we – 
that: 
One must somehow find a space for opposition to 
fundamentalism and racism, to sex discrimination and religious 
or ethnic discrimination, to the Muslim far right and the French 
far right. This requires an anti-racism which is unabashedly 
feminist, a feminism which is unequivocally anti-racist and a 
thick analysis of human rights.269 
We find Bennoune’s defense of the French hijab-ban entirely 
persuasive, and we endorse her highly-contextualized analysis based on 
commitments to both women’s equality and anti-racism. We also applaud 
her suggestion, as she muses on “uncovering the way forward,” that “the 
lack of a coherent human rights theory of secularism” is a “problem.”270 We 
                                                          
 264  LAZREG, supra note 162, at 7. 
 265  Id. Consider, too, Algerian Djemila Benhabib’s expression of a clear sense of agency: 
"No! You must know that there is nothing in my culture that makes me predestined to hide 
myself under a shroud, an ostentatious symbol of difference…That is indeed racism! Not to 
recognise that I have the same rights and obligations as everyone else, just because of my 
origins. I do not ask any privilege, any special right and any derogation from the law. I just 
want to be treated as a simple citizen. Is this really so hard to understand?…One of the 
intrinsic values of democracy is that of equal justice for all.” See DOSSIER 30-31: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR SECULARISM IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, supra note 260, at 229. 
 266  Bennoune, Law of the Republic, supra note 86, at 169. 
 267  Id.  
 268  Id.  
 269  Id. at 189.  
 270  Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights, supra note 196, at 425. Bennoune states 
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want, however, to take our argument one step beyond where Bennoune has 
ventured, and to insist that a renewed liberalism must be one committed to 
secularism as much as to feminism and to anti-racism. Indeed, we suggest 
that the commitment to secularism is necessary for effectuation of the other 
commitments. 
(4) Our answer to our broad reformulation of Okin’s question about 
multiculturalist-liberalism can be framed unequivocally: In a hierarchy of 
rights, women’s equality interests must always take priority over competing 
claims based upon religion or culture. 
Muslim fundamentalists are not alone in their systematic attacks on 
women’s rights (or on the related rights of stigmatized sexualities). In the 
United States at present, Christian evangelicals – whether or not 
“fundamentalist” – have been powerfully active in opposition to women’s 
equality interests. Gila Stopler has ably demonstrated liberalism’s long 
collusion with patriarchal religious forces oppressive of women, and we find 
her arguments highly persuasive that liberalism – to the degree that it is 
serious about protection of women’s equality – must commit or re-commit to 
protecting and enriching a culture of secularism.271 
Rhonda Copelon has pointed to the absence of such a well-developed 
culture in the United States, urging that the “maintenance of secularism” is 
essential for preservation of both “religious pluralism” and “women’s 
rights.”272 When secularism – embodied in separation of church and state – 
becomes weakened, what happens is that law openly prefers certain religious 
organizations over others, and certain individual women over others. As 
separation of church and state has eroded in the United States, the Supreme 
Court has shown no inclination to protect the autonomy and equality of 
women as individuals asserting rights of conscience with regard to 
reproduction.273 At the same time, in cases involving subsidizations of 
religion, the Court has undermined the value of religious pluralism as it has 
moved in the direction of “accommodating” religion, reckless about the 
                                                          
specifically, “A coherent gender sensitive human rights theory of secularism could be a 
valuable tool for negotiating between freedom of religion and gender equality, especially in 
today’s climate of religious extremism.” Id. at 425-26. She proposes, in the absence of such 
secularist theory, the “use of a careful, contextual approach to resolving these seemingly 
intractable conflicts [about the veil].” Id. 
 271  Gila Stopler, The Liberal Bind: The Conflict Between Women’s Rights and Patriarchal 
Religion in the Liberal State, 31 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 191 (2005). 
 272  See DOSSIER 30-31: THE STRUGGLE FOR SECULARISM IN EUROPE AND NORTH 
AMERICA, supra note 237-48; see also Ashe, supra note 70, at 198-209 (discussing the turn 
away from “religious pluralism” in the United States). 
 273  See Ashe, supra note 70, at 209-13. 
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reality that certain religions will be more “accommodated” than others.274 
Some cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights have similarly 
reflected preference for Christianity (the majority religion) over non-
religion275 or over non-Christian, including Muslim, interests.276 
The reality of legislative and judicial dis-preferencing of other religions 
relative to Christianity warrants much fuller documentation and analysis 
than is possible within the scope of this article. But the central consideration 
can be stated succinctly: to the degree that a dis-preferred religion is 
associated with ethnicity or race, judicial decisions accomplishing the dis-
preferences will be seen as racist. The only path away from both divisiveness 
based on race (or ethnicity) and policy highly inimical to women’s equality 
will be a path in the direction of secularism. 
CONCLUSION 
We have found many positive and valuable proposals within the texts 
we have reviewed in this essay. In our discussion of the major themes of 
those writings, our hope has been that readers who have found advocacy of 
multiculturalism persuasive in the past, will be awakened to realities that it 
has occluded, about which Okin, Lazreg, Bennoune, and Geerts have 
written. We hope, too that they will turn away from the seductions of 
                                                          
 274  These dissents have included that of Justice Breyer in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639, 717 (2002), in which the Supreme Court upheld governmental issuance of 
“vouchers” to parents to be used for payment of school children’s tuitions at private religious 
(and primarily Catholic) schools. Breyer noted the “social conflict, potentially created when 
government becomes involved in religious education.” Id. at 781. He urged recognition that 
such strife can be best avoided “not by providing every religion with an equal opportunity 
(say, to secure state funding or to pray in the public schools), but by drawing fairly clear lines 
of separation between church and state…” Id. at 722-23. Also notable is Justice Stevens’ 
dissent in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 706 (2005) in which the Court upheld 
governmental display of a large “Ten Commandments” monument on the grounds of the 
Capitol of the State of Texas. Stevens wrote to insist on governmental “neutrality.” Id. at 734. 
He rejected Justice Scalia’s propositions, in a related case, McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 
545 U.S. 844, 885 (2005), that government can favor religion over irreligion and can favor one 
religion over another and within the area of “public acknowledgment of religious belief…the 
Establishment Clause permits…disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, 
just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.” Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 275  For example, in Lautsi v. It., App. No. 30814-06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), the European 
Court of Human Rights (affected by the interpretative principle of “margin of appreciation,” 
which generally directs the Court’s deference to national court decisions) upheld, against the 
challenge of a secularist parent, the Italian governmental practice of placing crucifixes in all 
public school classrooms. 
 276  European Court of Human Rights decisions that appear to manifest special solicitude 
for Christianity (restricting free speech rights in order to protect sensibilities of Christians) 
have included Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1994) and 
Wingrove v. U.K., 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937 (1996).  
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multiculturalism, toward the challenge of restoring and renewing a liberal 
project for the 21st century – one that is truly feminist and anti-racist and 
secular. 
 
